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ABSTRACT
The end of the Cold War presents the United States with new opportunities and
challenges. During the Cold War, the U.S.-Japanese relationship was the linchpin of
security in the Pacific. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, it seems logical to analyze
pre-Bolshevik foreign policy to ascertain the likely direction of Russian policy in the Pacific.
Russia and Japan have had economic relations throughout their history; one of the primary
obstacles to normalized relations has been the Kurile Islands. Since Yeltsin has indicated
his willingness to negotiate on the issue of the islands, the possibility exists for closer
Russo-Japanese relations.
The reliance on military power has been overtaken by the need to ensure a country's
economic health. Japan, an ally during the Cold War, can now be viewed as an economic
competitor. Russia, an adversary during the Cold War, could be become an economic ally.
Continued U.S. influence in the Pacific requires a re-assessment of traditional relationships.
Alliances unheard of during the Cold War are now possible. Closer ties between Russia
and Japan could present new challenges to the United States in the Pacific. In order to
prevent a loss of influence in the Pacific, new policy choices with regard to Russia and
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Prior to the August 1991 coup, attempts at normalized
relations toward Japan by the Soviet Union were made by
Gorbachev as part of an emerging Asian strategy. The Kurile
Islands, or Northern Territories, question was still central
in the Japanese response. Additionally, Boris Yeltsin, while
still president of the Russian republic asserted that the
Kurile Islands were a Russian, not Soviet, possession;
therefore, it was not within Gorbachev's purview to make any
agreements with the Japanese concerning the islands. Since
the coup and the subsequent breakup of the central government
structures in the Soviet Union, Yeltsin, like Gorbachev, has
made overtures to the Japanese government that he is willing
to deal on the Kurile Islands in exchange for economic and
other assistance from Japan. Regardless of the final makeup
of the former Soviet Union, evidence tends to support the view
that either the Russian government of Boris Yeltsin or a
separate Russian Far East government will ultimately decide
the question of ownership of the Kuriles, in negotiations with
the Japanese.
Russia has a desire to be part of the "Pacific Century,"
and Yeltsin is attempting to develop the Siberian regions of
Russia in an attempt to make his country a part of the dynamic
Pacific region. The most useful partner in this attempt is
Japan. Since the former Soviet Union continues to fracture,
it becomes necessary to use a different approach to assess
what direction Russian policy toward Japan will take. It
seems a logical starting point in this endeavor appears to be
an analysis of pre-Bolshevik policy in the Pacific, especially
with Japan. A correlation can be made between this historical
relationship and the current development of relations. This
thesis will attempt to show that closer ties between Russia
and Japan could put pressure on the United States to adjust
its current policies toward both Japan and Russia. These
changes in policy would also have a direct impact on United
States relations with China, South Korea, Taiwan and other
countries in the Pacific Rim area. Additionally, these
changes would have a decided impact on American military-
deployments in the area and the implementation and execution
of U.S. foreign policy in the region.
It is necessary that the United States recognize that the
collapse of the Soviet Union has shifted the emphasis in the
formulation and implementation of foreign policy from military
power to economic power. Questions that need to be analyzed
from this new vantage point are:
• With the end of the Cold War should the United States
continue to view its relationship with Japan from a
military security viewpoint or should it view Japan
primarily as an economic competitor in the world economy
that can provide for its own military security?
• If Japan was to take on more of its own defense burden and
the costs associated with this defense, what steps, if
any, should be taken to ensure the security of other
nations in the area that would fear this new Japanese
militarism?
• If closer economic relations between Russia and Japan
develop, would this relationship pose a threat to U.S.
strategic and economic interests in the Pacific Rim area?
• What steps could the United States take to ensure its
continuing influence in the Pacific Rim area in light of
the changes in the world political and security arenas?
• What new security policy (ies) should the United States
implement that would best advance U.S. interests in the
Pacific Rim while ensuring both the economic and strategic
security of the Pacific Rim and the United States?
• Is the United States capable of acting and thinking
strategically in the Pacific Rim if its only credible
power in the area becomes military and not economic?
• Is it possible that "Balance of Power" politics will
reemerge as was practiced before World War II? If so,
what new alliances would best further U.S. interests in
the area?
The dissolution of the Soviet Union requires a new focus
by area specialists that takes into account the new power of
the republics now that central government controls are either
weak or non-existent. As a result of the end of the Cold War,
Russia is now attempting to forge new alliances with both
Europe and the "Pacific Dragons." Japan, the preeminent
dragon, is the key to Russian success in the Pacific Rim area.
Its traditional role, during the Cold War, as an American ally
should not be taken for granted by U.S. policymakers.
As the world approaches the twenty-first century, it is
obvious the United States is faced with the need to adapt to
the abrupt changes of the past seven years. No longer will
security policy be dominated by the old United States-Soviet
confrontation. New alliances, unheard of during the Cold War,
could emerge. How well the United States anticipates and
counterbalances these new changes will dictate the influence
it will have in the future.
B. THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC
Before the revolution of 1917, Russia was, potentially,
the most powerful country in Europe. Its size, resource
wealth, and population were the key parts of this potential.
After over seventy years of communist rule, the country still
possesses that potential. The mineral wealth of Russia
remains substantial. While some attempt will be made to
analyze a "Commonwealth, " most of the analysis will center on
the Russian Republic because of its size and the likelihood
that it may be all that will remain of the old Union if
current strains in the Commonwealth continue to their
seemingly inevitable end. Additionally, it is the largest
republic and spans the area from Europe to the Pacific Rim.
Coupled with this is the need to address the Russian
requirement to develop and exploit the economic riches in the
Siberian-East Asian area of Russia.
It is also necessary to address the different benefactors
that may assist Russia in its economic development. The
United States, Japan, and Western Europe are all interested in
assisting either the new "union" or the separate Republics
financially, yet there are varying degrees of concessions and
conditions tied to each country's assistance. Japan, due to
its economic power and proximity to the area the Russians seem
most anxious to develop, seems to be the frontrunner. While
the historic ties that Russia has to Europe cannot be
overlooked, the Japanese have the luxury of not being burdened
with trying to integrate the emerging countries of Eastern
Europe into a continental system and are better suited to give
assistance to Russia, especially the Siberian-East Asian
regions
.
Gorbachev's calls for economic assistance are well-known;
however, his removal from power and new career as a newspaper
columnist changed the debate. The economic plans of Boris
Yeltsin, especially his drive to institute a free market in
Russia, require foreign assistance, if he is to succeed.
While the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has
representatives in Russia advising the Yeltsin government, a
comprehensive plan has yet to be instituted.
The United States and Europe have given assistance only in
piecemeal fashion. While the food aid appears to have gotten
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) through the
winter, the domestic problems for Yeltsin have multiplied.
Problems with the Ukraine and other members who wish to
redefine their roles and responsibilities in the commonwealth
have kept Yeltsin from concentrating on improving the lot of
all citizens. The worsening economic climate has given those
elements calling for a return to Leninism or some other "ism"
the opportunity to rally in the streets and possibly gain some
converts from those who were enthusiastically in favor of
democracy in the euphoria following the failed coup.
The integration of Russia, and the other republics, into
the world political and economic communities and the position
it assumes in any "new world order" will have a far-reaching
impact . It is hoped that by analyzing the past some roadmap
of the future can be discerned. Knowing the probable path our
former adversary may follow will help the United States
formulate a policy that will be mutually beneficial. As
should be evident, the course Russia follows will have an
impact on U.S. relations with allies and could have
implications for its future influence in the world.
An examination of Russo-Japanese relations and Russian
foreign policy before the takeover of the communists in 1917,
as well as Russian influence in the Pacific will comprise
Chapter II. It will conclude with detailing the seizure of
the Kurile Islands at the end of World War II.
Relations between Russia and Japan, since World War II,
have revolved around the issue of the Kurile Islands. Any and
all attempts by the former Soviet Union to achieve some
normalcy of relations were rebuffed by the Japanese because of
this unresolved issue. Chapter III will look at Russp-
Japanese relations during the Cold War and show how the Kurile
Islands question kept the Japanese from fully exploiting the
economic resources of the Russian East Asian area.
Chapter IV will examine the changes in Soviet policy that
were articulated by Mikhail Gorbachev with regard to Soviet
interests in the Pacific. The post-Vladivostok period will
show that the Japanese continued to use the Kurile Islands as
a battering ram to blunt any initiatives by the Soviets to
achieve closer economic relations with Japan.
In the post-coup period, Yeltsin has been preoccupied with
trying to implement his economic reform package and, as a
consequence, has paid scant attention to relations with the
Japanese. Chapter V will look at the mineral resources of the
Russian Far East and the flexibility that access to this
market could give the Japanese. Additionally, there have been
indications that, just as the former republics declared their
independence, the Russian Far East may also declare itself to
be independent of the Russian Republic. What, if any effect,
this action might have on both the Kurile Islands question and
Japanese investment in the area will be examined, as well as
the implications for Russia, Japan, the United States, and the
Pacific Rim area.
Policy adjustments by the United States can and should be
made to take into account the changes that have occurred in
Dt
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the area since the end of the Cold War; nor can one ignore the
fact that wrong policy choices could have tremendous impact on
continued U.S. influence in the region. Some of the policy
choices available to the United States will be discussed in
Chapter VI.
II. PRE-BOLSHEVIK RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
A . JAPAN
Commodore Perry's opening of Japan in 1853 effectively
ended the Japanese isolation that had characterized her prior
history. Two years after this opening, Russia and Japan
concluded the first treaty ever between the two countries with
the signing of the Russo-Japanese Treaty of February 1855
(also called the Treaty of Shimoda) . ] Although the treaty was
signed, it also signaled the start of decades of confrontation
between the Japanese and the Russians which culminated in the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, which will be discussed later.
From China to the Korean peninsula, Russian and Japanese
interests continually clashed as each tried to press an
advantage to its own profit. Complicating matters for Russia
was its conflicting desire to be a Pacific power and the
intruding reality that it could not afford to maintain a
Pacific empire structure because of European needs. This
economic reality led to the sale of Alaska to the United
States in 1867 for $7.2 million.
-
1 Gerald Segal, The Soviet Union and the Pacific,
(Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 21.
2 There are many good studies of the problems Russia had
in maintaining its empire aspirations in the Pacific. Hugh
Seton-Watson in his book, The Russian Empire, details the
difficulties the Czar had in furthering his Pacific
It was also during this period that the groundwork was
laid for the major point of contention between Russia and
Japan that dominates their relations today, the Northern
Territories problem. Russia's involvement in the Pacific can
be traced to the reign of Peter the Great with the
establishment of colonies in Kamchatka. In 1700, a Japanese
clerk was captured and returned to Moscow where he met with
the Czar. Peter was so impressed that he issued orders for
further exploration in the Pacific. 3
The first appearance of Russians on the Kurile Islands is
open to debate. Seton-Watson places the event in the 1770s
when a Siberian merchant named Shelikhov sent expeditions to
the islands and also to the mainland of Alaska. 4 Fred H. Van
Peer makes mention of Russians exploring the norther Kuriles
in the 1750s while the Japanese were exploring the southern
portion of the island chain. 5 Whatever the time period, it
is obvious the dispute between the two countries is based on
aspirations (pp. 579-590). Additionally, John Lewis Gaddis'
book, Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An
Interpretive History, points out that the U.S. paid $2.7
million more than the price the Russians were willing to
settle for on the Alaskan sale. This appears to be proof of
the burdens of the Pacific "empire, " and the desire to get rid
of it at "fire sale" prices (p. 24) .
3 Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 1801-1917,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 55-6.
4 Seton-Watson, p. 56.
Fred H. Van Peer, The Northern Territories Problem:
A Key Factor in Soviet-Japanese Relations? (Defense Study,
Army Command and General Staff College, 1982), p. 4.
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over 200 years of history and that each side feels it can
trace a legitimate claim to the territories.
As mentioned earlier, the Treaty of Shimoda was the first
treaty signed between Japan and Russia; it also serves as the
basis of Japanese claims to the Kurile Islands today. A later
treaty, the Treaty of St. Petersburg, signed in 1875, ceded
all Russian claims to the central and northern Kuriles to the
Japanese in return for ceding all Japanese claims to Sakhalin
Island. 6
Both countries were exploiting the resources of the chain:
while the Russians were trapping and pushing south in an
attempt to find a trade route to a still closed Japan, the
Japanese were actively trading with the natives of Kunashiri
and Etorofu. Ultimately, this led to armed conflict with the
Russians in 1807 because of the lack of formal borders. 7 The
importance of this dispute to the present will be addressed
later; for the moment, it is instructive to analyze Russia's
relations in the Pacific from a perspective of its attempt to
"cut its losses" while still maintaining an important
balancing role in the area.
Russian policy in the Pacific area was characterized by
the signing of secret treaties and the entering into of
6 Van Peer, p. 22. Andrew Mack and Martin O'Hare also
make mention of this treaty in "Moscow-Tokyo and the Northern
Territories Dispute," Asian Survey, 30, no. 4, (April 1990),
p. 380.
7 Segal, p . 22
.
11
alliances that would counteract the growing Japanese hegemony
in the Pacific. Indicative of this policy was its signing of
a treaty in 1896 with China after the Chinese were defeated by
the Japanese. This was a treaty of convenience which was
strongly supported by S.Y. Witte, Finance Minister to Nicholas
II, who saw this alliance as necessary to counter Japanese
gains after the defeat of the Chinese in Korea. Witte wanted
to allow Russia to gain time while the Trans-Siberian Railway
was completed; his feeling was that upon its completion Russia
would be better able to make its influence felt in the Russian
Far East and Pacific area. 8 Illustrative of the Russian
regard for treaties, however, comes from the fact that four
years later Russia took the lead in punishing China for the
Boxer Rebellion of 1900. 9
The intervening years between the signing of the treaty of
alliance between China and Russia gives great insight into
pre-Bolshevik Russian foreign policy practices. It was only
with the assistance of Germany and France that Russia was able
to blunt some of the harsh terms that Japan was prepared to
force on China. Instead of receiving all the territory it
originally wanted to receive from China, Japan was forced to
8 Seton-Watson, pp. 581-583.
Segal, p. 22. As Segal points out, " (e)ven though
Russia perceived China as an ally against Japan, it
nevertheless placed its own interests first, even at the
expense of the Chinese.
12




While relying on the French and Germans to assist in
keeping Japan under control, the Russians were also involved
in expanding their influence at the expense of its supposed
allies. Ultimately, in 1898, Russia was able to have ceded to
it by the Chinese those territories that Japan had demanded as
its spoils of war. Russia received the Liaotung Peninsula and
Port Arthur for twenty-five years, as well as a concession of
land to build a railroad in South Manchuria. n This policy
of entering into alliances of convenience and expediency was
also characteristic of Russia's foreign policy in Europe.
B. RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN EUROPE
While it may seem unusual or unnecessary to look at pre-
Bolshevik Russian policy in Europe, it is relevant to the
events of today. Now, as then, Russia is attempting to
approach the West and be an important entity on the world
stage. Then, as now, Russia is seen as a weak and backward
country that possesses great potential and substantial
military force but internal struggles hampered the formulation
of a coherent foreign policy.
10 Seton-Watson, pp. 582-3
11 Ibid, pp. 584-5.
13
Russian foreign policy in Europe seems to have evolved
from one of playing the role of "moderation in international
affairs" 12 to a mirror image of its role in the Pacific-
entering into secret alliances in an attempt to press an
advantage or blunt an adversary's position of superiority.
Seton-Watson points to the conflict between "Westernizers " and
"Slavophils" in Russia during the 1840' s. This conflict
centered on the interpretation each side had of Peter the
Great's attempts to modernize Russia. The "Westernizers" saw
Peter as a visionary, while the "Slavophils" saw Peter as a
great ruler who led Russia down the wrong path. 13
Essentially, the dispute centered on the question of whether
Russian policy would be one of Russian Nationalism, or if
foreign policy initiatives would be based on the concept of
Pan-slavism. 14 The pursuit of a Western policy allowed
Nicholas to carve out the perception of Russia as a great land
power and mediator on the continent. 1 " A debate of a similar
type can be seen going on in Russia today, as Yeltsin attempts
to hold a loose commonwealth together and formulate the path
that Russia should take to enter the world political arena.
Yeltsin's struggle to implement reforms against the
lz Nicholas Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 4th ed. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 331.
13 Seton-Watson, p. 266
14 Ibid, pp. 267-8.
15 Ibid, p. 280
14
obstructionist moves of former party apparatchiks resembles
the old struggle between "Westernizers " and "Slavophils."
The importance of Russia's role in the emergence of
Germany as a European power is open to some debate; 16
however, it is undeniable that the government's favoring of
Prussia during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 gave Bismarck
the luxury of knowing that not only " . . .his eastern frontier
was secure but also because Austria was held back from helping
France by the fear that if she did Russia might attack
her. " 17
This Russian alliance with Prussia was set in place to
achieve the rollback of the Black Sea clauses which was
accomplished. Characteristically, the solidity of the Russo-
Prussian alliance was shown to be ephemeral in 187 5 when
Russia joined in a protest with Britain against the hint of
German intentions to attack the French. 18 This protest did
not keep the Germans from concluding a secret Reinsurance
Treaty with the Russians in 1887 when the Alliance of the
16 Seton-Watson, pp. 437-8.
17 Seton-Watson, p. 437.
18 Ibid, p. 438. As a result of the Crimean War, Russia
was precluded from having any armaments located in or on the
Black Sea. As a result of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870,




Three Emperors expired, which remained in force until 1890
when Bismarck was forced to resign. 1 '1'
The period of Alexander Ill's and Nicholas II 's rule was
marked by this pattern of "alliances of the moment" which were
entered into with no intention of continuing them when the
intended goal had been reached. Part of this pattern can be
explained by the evolving relationships that were taking place
on the continent; part can be explained as being a reflection
of the policies pursued by other European powers at the same
time; however, the underlying reality seems to have been
economic, especially the alliance with the French in the late
nineteenth century.^ Much like today, Russia during this
period was in need of financial support from foreign partners.
During this period, only the French were in a position to
provide the Russians with the money necessary; the cost was an
Riasanovsky, p. 399. The Alliance of the Three
Emperors was between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. It
was a treaty that called for friendly neutrality between the
three if one of the members entered a war with a fourth party,
other than Turkey. During 1886-7, Germany was embroiled in
political crises with numerous countries. Bismarck was able
to negotiate with Russia the Reinsurance Treaty, which made
known to Russia German desires for friendly relations.
However, the ultimate goal of Bismarck was to restore the
Alliance of the Three Emperors, a goal he was unable to
achieve
.
20 Riasanovsky, pp. 399-401.
16
alliance that was to remain in force as long as the Triple
Alliance remained in effect. 21
Russia's relations with Great Britain were characterized
by tensions in East and Central Asia, especially along the
Indian and Afghan borders. While a war never materialized,
there were armed encounters between Russian- and English-
supported troops in Afghanistan in 1885. 22 Additionally, by
virtue of the signing of a treaty with Great Britain in 1907,
the final link in the Triple Entente was put in place that
would fight the Triple alliance in World War I. For several
reasons, the alliance of Russia with the French and British
was extremely popular with a broad cross-section of Russian
society: tariff problems had arisen in Russia's relations with
Germany; and, there was a general desire to de-emphasize
"historic" Russo-German ties. 23
Russian foreign policy initiatives with the United States
were limited during this period to Alaska, and on the
21 Riasanovsky, Seton-Watson and Gaddis give good accounts
of this economic alliance with France. Riasanovsky points out
that the French were able to push the "hesitant" Russians into
a closer alliance than they might have wished for by using the
economic need of the Russians. He further points out that
while this alliance was economic, politics still was the prime
motivator
.
22 Both Riasanovsky and Seton-Watson give good accounts
of Anglo-Russian relations and the attempts to avoid armed
conflict in Asia. Also, Segal gives a good analysis of
Britain's interests in the Russo-Japanese War, a conflict to
be discussed later.
23 Riasanovsky, pp. 416-17.
17
periphery, to emerging Russian and U.S. interests in the
Pacific. Gaddis points to early conflicts between the U.S.
and Russia over Russian attempts to establish a presence in
Alaska that the U.S. objected. Subsequently, the United
States invoked the Monroe Doctrine. Gaddis also points out
that while the Russians were on the receiving end of the first
practical application of the Doctrine, the true focus of the
Doctrine was the British and the French. 24 With the purchase
of Alaska by the United States in 1867, foreign policy
confrontations between Russia and the U.S. were essentially
non-existent
.
C. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
Having briefly discussed the direction and style of pre-
Bolshevik Russian foreign policy as a whole, it is logical to
examine this policy in action and the resulting conflict with
the Japanese in 1904-5. Besides being an example of bungled
policy, the Russo-Japanese War is the next step in the
conflict over the Kurile Islands. ~ r '
Russian actions in the Pacific continued to be at odds
with Japanese aims; the maneuvering by both countries for an
advantage laid the groundwork for armed conflict. The
24 Gaddis, pp. 8-9 and 11
25 An excellent study of Russian Far Eastern policy with
a special emphasis on the causes of the Russo-Japanese War is
Andrew Malozemoff's Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904
,
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1958).
18
British, obviously alarmed over Russian inroads in China, had
attempted to negotiate a settlement that would satisfy the
aims of both countries. The Russian government, however, was
plagued with indecision and an inability to implement a stable
foreign policy; this aimlessness helped push the British into
signing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in January 1902. In
addition to being a mutual defense pact, the treaty also
recognized Japanese interests in Korea, a country that Russia
and Japan were also at odds over. 2t
The roots of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 has its
roots in Korea. A faction in the Czarist court saw Korea,
especially the Yalu valley in Northern Korea, as an excellent
supplier of timber for Russia. Nicholas II was enticed into
allowing this faction to proceed with its plans, probably
because he was made a partner in the development company, as
well as his weak control over his own court." 7 Because of
this weak control and the loss of Witte's counsel as Finance
Minister (Witte was forced out when he was unable to persuade
the Czar to resist the lure of the timber development
company) , Nicholas allowed Russia to be put into a position
where she was isolated in her disagreement with Japan. In
addition to the British, Japan was supported by the United
26 Seton-Watson, pp. 586-7. Nicholas Riasanovsky in his
book, A History of Russia, characterizes Russian policy in the





27 Seton-Watson, pp. 587-8. and Riasanovsky, pp. 401-3.
19
States in her position on the Korean peninsula. While U.S.
involvement extended only to the commercial realm, it is
ironic that a trade agreement was signed between the United
States and Japan on the day that Russian forces were supposed
to be evacuated from Manchuria- an action that Russia failed
to accomplish. 28
France attempted to mediate some solution to the
situation; however, those actions came too late for the
Japanese had already decided that war with Russia was the only
solution. Three days after breaking off diplomatic relations
on 5 February 1904, the Japanese launched a surprise attack on
Port Arthur which they were to copy again almost thirty-seven
years later at Pearl Harbor. Japan was able to achieve quick
mastery of the seas by blockading Port Arthur through the use
of mines; this effectively kept the Russian navy bottled up,
unable to do more than practice feints and jabs against the
Japanese . 29
The length of the war was dictated by the inability of
either side to gain a decisive advantage on land and the added
factor of "General Winter, " which forced both sides to winter
over without any movement. This set up the biggest battle of
the war, the Battle of Mukden, which lasted from 18 February
to 10 March 1905. While this battle inflicted huge casualties
28 Seton-Watson, pp. 589-90.
29 Seton-Watson, pp. 590-7. and Riasanovsky, p. 402-3
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on both sides, it also proved to both sides that neither would
be able to defeat the other. Russia was unable to reinforce
her troops and the Japanese realized that their resources were
stretched too thinly to achieve superiority. However, Russia
declined to negotiate an armistice because the government was
both hampered by a festering revolution in Moscow and, more
importantly, was hoping the Baltic fleet, which had been sent
around Africa, could tip the balance at sea in her favor. 30
This proved to be a disasterous decision; the Japanese met and
sank almost all of the Baltic fleet. However, even with this
decisive victory at sea, the land war still kept either side
from claiming victory.
President Theodore Roosevelt offered to mediate a peace
agreement; an offer that was accepted this time and resulted
in the Treaty of Portsmouth. Witte was brought back by
Nicholas to negotiate with the Japanese and he proved to be
extremely effective; in fact, he was so effective that he
turned American inclinations away from the Japanese to the
Russians. Also, while Witte negotiated away Russian interests
in China and on the Korean peninsula, he refused to pay an
indemnity to Japan or cede Russian territory to the Japanese.
Ultimately, he won on the indemnity point and achieved partial
success on the ceding of territory. The Japanese wanted
Sakhalin Island; unable to get the whole, they settled for a
30 Seton-Watson, pp. 595-6.
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halving of the island. 31 The settlement reached at
Portsmouth was to remain in effect until World War II. Japan,
at this time, possessed all of the Kurile Islands, Shikotan,
the Habomais, and Sakhalin below the 50th parallel.' 2
D. ANALYSIS
Pre-Bolshevik foreign policy was characterized by an
expediency of the moment that was not unique to Russia;
rather, it seems to be a policy that was practiced by all of
the major world powers at the time. Shifting alliances were
the order of the period. Russia seems to have played the role
of international mediator in many disputes between European
powers; she was able to utilize her unique position on the
eastern edge of Europe to good advantage. The major weakness
seems to have been the court intrigues of the Czar which kept
Russia from realizing any longlasting benefits from any
alliance
.
Russia's desire to be a Pacific power ran into the reality
of economic limitations: rather than accept this fact, she
tried to practice the same policies that were being utilized
on the continent. Unfortunately, geography and the rising
hegemonistic desires of Japan were to lead to the Russo-
31 Seton-Watson, p. 597.
32 Mack and O'Hare, p. 381.
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Japanese War which effectively rebuffed any real Russian
influence in the area until the end of World War II.
Also, the defeat of the Russian army and navy by Japan had
repercussions for Russia on the continent. Her traditional
role as a desirable counterweight in alliances was reduced;
her defeat also led her to mix economic needs with political
wants, ultimately leading to an alliance with France that was
primarily motivated by a need for money. Ironically, this
forced alliance would have been in Russia's favor when World
War I ended since she was on the winning side; however, the
Bolshevik Revolution effectively ended any gain she might have
realized from this alliance.
Soviet foreign policy, which will be looked at later in
more detail, would ultimately isolate Russia from countries
with which she had once played an important role. Rather than
being an important counterweight in world affairs, Russia
would find herself an outcast from the circle of influential
countries; she would be the object of alliances to prevent her
form exerting any real influence in the world.
The above should not be construed as ignoring any impact
Soviet policies had, especially with regard to Germany prior
to World War II, however, the overall importance of Russia
declined with the rise of the Bolsheviks to power. This was
to remain the case until after World War II and the beginning
of the Cold War. The fact remains that those countries Russia
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had once had, at a minimum, cordial relations with were now
all arrayed against her.
Proceeding from the premise that the collapse of the
Soviet Union is a harbinger of a change in Russian foreign
policy from one of confrontation to one of accommodation, it
is possible to make correlations from pre-Bolshevik policy to
policy choices today. An examination of some of these choices
will be done in Chapter V. Before turning to the Cold War
period in Russian Pacific foreign policy, it is important to
put the final piece of the Kurile Islands problem into focus.
Therefore, Russian actions during World War II to re-occupy
the territories will be examined.
E. THE RUSSIAN SEIZURE OF THE KURILE ISLANDS DURING WORLD WAR
II
The key to Russian relations with Japan remains the Kurile
Islands 33 . Three separate, yet important, events during
World War II have tremendous bearing on the Kurile Islands
question today: The Cairo Conference of 1943, The Yalta
33 The use of the word "Russian" is two-fold in purpose.
As mentioned in the introduction, with the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the uncertainty of what form of central
government will emerge, if any, it is necessary to make a
distinction between Soviet policy and the policy that will be
used in this new era. Because the Russian Republic appears to
be taking the lead, under Yeltsin, in defining this new policy
era, it seems logical to use the term "Russian."
Additionally, the use of the term emphasizes the continuity of
pre-Bolshevik policy, which was Russian. Since the area in
question is part of the Russian Republic, this also justifies
the use of the term.
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Conference of 1945, and the San Francisco Peace Treaty of
1951. Either through the action or inaction of the Soviets
during each event, another piece of the conflict that
continues today between Russia and Japan was put into place.
As mentioned earlier, the Treaty of St. Petersburg
legitimized Japanese claims to the Kurile Islands in exchange
for the relinquishing of all claims on Sakhalin. At the end
of the Russo-Japanese War, the Treaty of Portsmouth, while not
dealing with the Kuriles, ceded the southern half of Sakhalin
to Japan and also granted the Japanese fishing rights along
those areas of Russia that were near Japan. 34
In 1943, at the Cairo Conference, the Americans, British
and Chinese began the process of detailing the retribution
that would be exacted on Japan at the conclusion of the
Pacific War. What price the Russians would demand for entry
into that war was also discussed; even though Stalin did not
attend the Cairo Conference because he did not want to be
associated with Chiang Kai-Shek, when presented with the text
of the Cairo Communique, Stalin had no comment to make. This
is taken as his agreement with the communique. A key part of
the communique stated in vague terms what was to come:
(t)he three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain
and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain
for themselves and have no thought of territorial
expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be
34 John M. Maki , Conflict and Tension in the Far East- Key
Documents , 1894-1960
,
(Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1961), pp. 18-23.
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stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has
seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World
War in 1914, and that all territories Japan has stolen
from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the
Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.
Japan will also be expelled from all the other territories
which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid
three powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of
Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall
become free and independent. 35
Even though the Kuriles were not mentioned by name in this
document, the Yalta Agreement referred to them. Later, at
Potsdam, the commitments the United States made at Yalta were
the price Stalin placed on the Soviet entry into the war in
the Pacific. 36 There can be no doubt as to what Stalin
wanted. Rees quotes Averell Harriman from a meeting with
Stalin at which Ambassador Harriman was attempting to find out
for Roosevelt the conditions for Russia's entry into the
Pacific War. Stalin showed Harriman a map and said "...that
the Kurile Islands and the lower Sakhalin should be returned
to Russia. " 37
The Yalta Conference was even more direct, in that the
three demands of the Russians were spelled out. Clause three
is unambiguous; it reads "The Kurile Islands shall be handed
over to the Soviet Union ." 38Immediately after the Japanese
35 David Rees, The Soviet Seizure of the Kuriles, (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1985), p. 52.
36 Charles L. Mee, Jr., Meeting at Potsdam, (New York: M.
Evans and Company, Inc., 1975), p. 53.
37 Rees, p. 58.
38 Ibid, p. 64.
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surrender, Stalin moved to take control of the islands and
this possession continues through today.
Because of the beginning of the Cold War in the interim
between the end of World War II and the signing of the Treaty
of Peace with Japan, John Foster Dulles and Prime Minister
Shigeru Yoshida set in motion events that, while including the
Japanese relinquishing claims to the islands, would keep any
power from laying legal claim to them if it did not sign and
ratify the treaty. The Cold War climate ensured that the
Senate of the United States would not ratify any treaty that
included the Yalta concessions and that the Soviets would not
sign any treaty that did not include them. Absent a listed
beneficiary, the Senate ratified the treaty and the Soviets
refused to sign it. Essentially, this left claim to the
islands in limbo. The final step in repudiation of the Yalta
concessions came when both Secretary Dulles and Prime Minister
Yoshida supported Japanese "historical" claims to the
islands. 39 Given this impasse, the situation played a
decisive role in solidifying the American-Japanese alliance in
the Pacific and effectively stopped any attempts at
normalization between Russia and Japan during the Cold War.
Relations during the Cold War will be discussed in the next
chapter
.
39 Rees, pp. 94-99.
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III. THE COLD WAR PERIOD
A. SOVIET NAVAL FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AND THE USE OF THE
KURILES
The signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan by the
United States firmly placed Japan in the U.S. sphere of
influence during the Cold War. Recognizing this, the Soviet
Union began to consolidate its position on the Kuriles and
incorporated them into its strategic plans. Upon the death of
Stalin, Khrushchev began the process of changing the Soviet
Navy. He appointed Admiral Sergei Gorshkov as Commander-in-
Chief of the Soviet Navy. By the mid-sixties, Gorshkov had
succeeded in turning the Soviet Navy from an emphasis on
capital ships to a more balanced fleet that incorporated
submarines, smaller combat ships and defensive ships, such as
minesweepers . 40
If Gorshkov was the father of the modern Soviet Navy, then
his successor, Fleet Admiral V.N. Chernavin, has overseen the
development of a quality fleet. This fleet evolved into one
which rivaled the U.S. fleet. Also, the missions of the
Soviet Navy evolved to include the following:
-Operate and protect the Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleet
40 Bryan Raft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet
Strategy, (Annapolis: The Naval Institute Press, 1989), pp.
161-163.
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strategic nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)
force;
-Protect the seaward approaches of the Soviet Union from
air, sea, or amphibious attack- especially from nuclear-
capable enemy forces such as SSNs, aircraft carrier battle
groups, air- and sea-launched cruise missiles and their
launch platforms; and
-Support Soviet ground forces by securing contiguous
maritime flanks, by providing naval fire and logistical
support, conducting amphibious assaults, and disrupting
enemy sea lines of communication. 41
Depending on the source cited, during the Cold War, the Soviet
Pacific fleet became the largest fleet or equaled the size of
the Northern Fleet. 42 Regardless of the correct estimate, it
is indisputable that the Soviets emphasized the Pacific region
when it came to defense. They also used the Kuriles as a part
of this overall naval strategy. Since the 1960s, the Soviets
have used a base in Burotan Bay at the north end of Simushir
as a submarine base and a possible staging area for local
attacks. The base is also used as a mine storage area. These
41 Soviet Military Power 1990, (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 82.
42 Derek da Cunha, Soviet Naval Power in the Pacific,
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1990) suggests that
the Pacific Fleet has become the equal in size and firepower
to the Northern Fleet. However, Malcolm Mackintosh states in
"Soviet Strategic Dilemmas in the North Pacific in the 1990s,
"
in Ross Babbage, ed., The Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s,
(Rushcutters Bay, Australia: Pergamon Press, 1989), that he




mines would be used to keep out enemy ships and secure the Sea
of Okhotsk in event of war. 43
Additionally, the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) estimated
in 1990 that the Soviets had a division-size force in the
Kurile Islands equipped with top of the line Soviet arms. In
addition to tanks, MI-24 Hind helicopters and armored
personnel carriers, this division also had at its disposal 152
mm cannon. The report also placed Mig-23 aircraft at a base
on Etorofu Island. 44
B. ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE KURILE ISLANDS QUESTION DURING THE
COLD WAR
Although there were several attempts during the Cold War
to come to some solution over the Kurile Islands, they share
two common points. First, they all ultimately failed, and
second, they all mirrored the failure of the Peace
Negotiations of 1955-6 between Japan and the Soviet Union.
The talks began with both sides sticking to their usual
positions. For the Japanese, this included room for
negotiation over the Kurile Islands after a peace treaty had
been signed; the Soviets, on the other hand, stuck to their
43 da Cunha, pp. 73-4. da Cunha also makes the point in
his book that given the modernization of the Pacific Fleet in
both its surface and Naval Air Force, the United States would
face a formidable opponent during any confrontation between
the two fleets.
44 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan-1990
, p. 47
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position that the Japanese had no claim to either the Kuriles
or southern Sakhalin Island. 45
A sudden change in the Soviet position in August 1955 gave
hope to Matsumoto that the Japanese could get at least half of
what they wanted, the islands of Habomais and Shikotan, and
that negotiations for the other half of the loaf could be
discussed at a later date. Unfortunately, Tokyo was in
disarray and instructions came back to Matsumoto not to accept
the Soviet offer; this resulted in a return by the Soviets to
their previous hard-line position on the territories. Talks
were halted and did not begin again until the following
year. 46 When these talks also failed to bear fruit, the
pattern had been established for all future talks between the
Japanese and the Soviets over the Kurile Islands-neither side
would move from their cemented positions.
Another common thread throughout the Cold War negotiations
over the Kurile Islands was a call by the Soviets that Japan
remove all foreign troops from her soil. Bluntly put, the
Soviets wanted the Japanese to remove all American forces from
Japan, effectively ending the alliance formed in 1951 between
45 There are few comprehensive English language sources
that cover these negotiations. One good amalgamation is
Michael L. Thompson, The Northern Territories : Case Study in
Japanese-Soviet Relations, (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate
School, 1982) . The best Japanese publication is written by
the negotiator for the Japanese at the talks, Shunichi
Matsumoto, Moskwa ni Kakeru Niji, (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Sha,
1966) .
46 Thompson, p. 22.
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the U.S. and Japan. The Soviet position of wanting to
separate the Americans from Japan, coupled with the post-1956
Japanese position that all the islands had to be returned, has
continued to this day.
C. GROWING JAPANESE MILITARY CAPABILITY DURING THE COLD WAR
There seems to be a popular misconception in the United
States that Japan is a country without any self-defense
capability. Such is not the case; since the 1970s, Japan has
dramatically modernized its Japanese Self Defense Force
(JSDF) . While it is not the intention of the author to detail
this modernization, it is necessary to address this growing
ability of the Japanese to defend themselves. It is at the
heart of the debate over what direction U. S . -Japanese
relations should take now that the Cold War is receding into
history
.
It is difficult to tabulate exactly how many ships are in
the Soviet Pacific Fleet since the break-up of the Soviet
Union. Furthermore, there are questions about the mission of
this fleet given the changes in the world. What is known is
the majority of the Soviet Pacific Fleet was commissioned
before 1970 and lacks the necessary capability to defend
itself against a force equipped with cruise missiles. 4 ' This
47 The majority of information on capabilities and
equipment on Soviet Pacific Fleet ships comes from Jane's
Weapons Systems 1990-91 (London: Jane's Publishers, Ltd.,
1990) and Jane's Fighting Ships 1990-91 (London: Jane's
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should not be construed as minimizing Soviet abilities. Their
ships
"
are still capable of inflicting great harm on enemy
ships, primarily due to the capability of their onboard
missiles, like the SS-12. 48
While the Soviet Fleet is still large, it cannot and has
not kept pace with the modernization of the Japanese Maritime
Self Defense Force (JMSDF) . The majority of the Japanese
fleet was built after 1970; it is technologically advanced,
utilizing state-of-the-art electronics, self-defense systems,
and new propulsion techniques. 45 Given this disparity in
force modernization and technological sophistication, why is
it taken for granted in this country that the Japanese are
incapable of providing for their own defense? While it is
true Japan would need to rely on the U.S. for its carrier
force and nuclear capability, the JSDF and JMSDF are, in the
conventional arena, quite a formidable force. In some areas,
mine-sweeping especially, the Japanese are very proficient-
events after the Gulf War point to this. 50 Why then, does
the impression remain that the Japanese are a non-military
Publishers, Ltd., 1990).
48 Norman Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1983), p. 366.
49 Stephen Yoder, "Japanese Ship Will Use Super
Conductors," Asian Wall Street Journal, 17 August 1988, p. 3.
Also, Jane's Fighting Ships 1990-91.
50 Kunio Nishimura, "Making History, " Look Japan, December
1991, pp. 9-10.
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country? The answer seems to be in two parts. First, American
defense writers perpetuate this myth, and second, there is a
misconception in this country concerning the Japanese
Constitution, especially Article Nine, the so-called "no
military clause."
D. JAPAN'S USE OF HER CONSTITUTION TO ACHIEVE SECURITY AND
ECONOMIC AIMS DURING THE COLD WAR
During the Cold War, Japan was concerned with both the
capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union. While the
capabilities of the Soviet forces in the Russian Far East were
well-known, the intentions of the Soviets were not always so
easily discerned. The Japanese entered into a bi-lateral
defense arrangement with the United States during the Cold War
to deter any Soviet threat. By relying on the United States
for its defense, Japan could continue to concentrate on
rebuilding her economic strength. Recent changes in the
former Soviet Union have now given rise to calls in this
country that Japan spend more of her budget on defense. Japan
has grudgingly done so, but only on forces that it calls
defensive
.
While the Japanese are a non-nuclear power, they are quite
capable of defending themselves conventionally with some
assistance from the U.S. Was it part of a Japanese plan to
present themselves to the world as non-military? The answer
seems to be yes. Shigeru Yoshida was instrumental in keeping
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Japan from becoming a part of any multilateral Pacific defense
or security system. The instrument he used to accomplish this
brings us to the second part of the equation, the Japanese
Constitution.
Yoshida, prime minister from 1946-1954, formulated a
policy that would allow Japan to focus on economic development
and leave the defense of Japan primarily to the Americans. He
acknowledged that this swap of bases for security may seem
"devious," 51 but he had a U.S. provided cover- the Japanese
Constitution. The full quote makes even more clear what
Yoshida's intent was in this regard
...the day [for rearmament] will come naturally when our
livelihood recovers. It may seem devious (zurui)
, but let
the Americans handle our security until then. If the
Americans complain, the constitution gives us a perfect
justification (chanto shita riyu ni naru) . The
politicians who want to amend it are fools. 52
51 Kenneth Pyle, "How Japan Sees Itself At Home, In Asia,
and Around the World, The American Enterprise, 2, #6 (1991),
p. 31.
52 Kenneth Pyle, "The Post-Cold War Order in East Asia:
The View From Tokyo, 19 92, p. 7. This is a draft paper which
was presented at the Second Annual Workshop on Asian Politics
held in Monterey, CA on March 19-20, 1992. It is used with
permission of the author. Probably the most interesting
aspect of the Yoshida quote is the aide to whom he was
speaking- Miyazawa Kiichi, Japan's Prime Minister at the time
of the writing of this thesis [June 1992].
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1. Development of the Constitution53
Immediately after the end of World War II, General
MacArthur notified the Government of Japan of the need to
reform the old Constitution. A committee was formed which
drew up two drafts; both were rejected when presented to
MacArthur as being too conservative. What followed next forms
the crux of the debate between those in the U.S. and Japan who
believe Japan has a right to re-arm itself for self-defense
and those who interpret the Constitution in a way that
precludes any resurgence of the Japanese military.
One faction holds that MacArthur inserted a clause
renouncing the use of force even in the instance of providing
for security. The opposite view holds that this clause was
presented to MacArthur by Prime Minister Shidehara.
Interestingly, Auer quotes Yoshida as recalling events in this
manner; not surprising, given Yoshida 's statement that the use
of the Constitution to pursue economic interests "may seem
devious .
"
Other evidence comes from the comments of the chairman
of an investigation committee that examined the origination of
5J All of the following section is compiled from James E.
Auer, "Article Nine of Japan's Constitution: From
Renunciation of Armed Force 'Forever' to the Third Largest
Defense Budget in the World, " Law and Contemporary Problems
,
53, nos . 1&2 (1990), pp. 171-87. This article was part of a
special edition of the journal that dealt with Japan's




the Constitution, Professor Takayanagi:
Article 9 had its origins in Tokyo, not in Washington.
The idea was first suggested by Prime Minister Shidehara,
not by General MacArthur. . . .No one else was present at the
interview which continued for some three hours. Shidehara
astonished the General with a proposal for the insertion
of renunciation-of -war and disarmament clause into the new
Constitution. Apparently the General hesitated at first
because of the possible deleterious effects on United
States foreign policy in East Asia, if the proposal were
approved. . . .before the SCAP draft and Japanese government
bill were drawn, the General and the Prime Minister agreed
to insert such a clause in the new Constitution-' 4
When the above is coupled with MacArthur 's memoirs, in which
he avers the belief that Japan had the right to arm for self-
defense, the pattern established by Yoshida of accentuating
the economic and leaving the costs and associated burdens of
defense to the Americans becomes clear. This issue will be
discussed more in Chapter Six, as well as U.S. responsibility
for allowing this policy to be practiced with little or no
interference until recently.
2. Japan's Economic Growth During the Cold War
In the aftermath of World War II, the Japanese economy
was in shambles, not just from the war but from the combined
effects of having been involved in military adventures for
almost two decades. Ironically, it was American involvement
in the Korean War that set the stage for one of the most
remarkable economic success stories of the twentieth century.
When U.S. forces entered Korea, they relied on the Japanese
54 Quoted in Auer, pp. 173-4
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for supplies such as binoculars, trucks, and cameras. 51
While Ambassador Reischauer tends to give more credit to the
Japanese for their recovery because of societal factors, it
was an American statistician, Dr. Edwards Deming, who is
widely recognized, even in Japan, as the person who provided
the expertise necessary to reform Japanese business and
industry to achieve the successes it has enjoyed.
Demings's concentration on Total Quality Management
(TQM) techniques were ignored in the U.S., but
enthusiastically embraced by the Japanese. Proof of the
success of these ideas and their importance to the rapid
emergence of the Japanese economy can be seen in the annual
award of the Deming Prize in Japan to the company that best
exemplifies Demings's principles. Also, if imitation is the
sincerest form of flattery, then the fact that numerous
American firms are now implementing Demings's TQM techniques
is further proof of their importance to the post-war economic
recovery of Japan.
If the Korean War was the catalyst for the economic
recovery of Japan, then the 1960s and 1970s were the result of
that charged boost. The only blip on the screen for the
Japanese was the Oil Crisis of 1973, which they effectively
met by economizing and reducing energy-reliant industries and
Edwin 0. Reischauer, The Japanese Today (Cambridge,
Mass.: Belknap Press, 1988), pp. 309-12.
refocusing their efforts toward clean, high-technology
industries
.
As an indication of the boom experienced in the 60s
and 70s, consider the following statistics. For the period
1965-1974, industrial production in Japan doubled; steel
production went from 41.1 million tons to 117.1 million tons;
production of passenger cars went from less than one million
to over 4.5 million. Sb Following a concerted effort to
reduce energy expenditures and waste, dependence on oil for
energy was reduced from a high of over 80 percent in 1972,
before the Oil Crisis, to 61 percent in 1983.
"
While the perception in this country seems to be that
it is primarily in the automobile industry that Japan has
achieved superiority, such is not the case. Japan also leads
the world or is a major competitor in the following fields:
cameras, VCRs, Tvs, computer chips, computers, genetic
engineering, and radios. In the world of consumer
electronics, Japan has fully 90 percent of the market. ss
The result of this economic growth is that Japan is
once again the pre-eminent power in the Northeast Asian area.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Japan's defense
expenditures, while barely over one percent of GNP (this
S(S Mikiso Hane, Modern Japan: A Historical Survey
Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p. 377.
57 Ibid, p. 378.
58 Ibid, p. 378.
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includes the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in Japan) are now
among the highest in the world. This translates into $33




As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the
Japanese have been able to achieve this economic success while
under the protection of the American military. Moreover,
Japan was ushered into the world economy with United States
sponsorship. Many of the countries in Europe resisted this
move, and it was only because of U.S. insistence that Japan
was given membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) in 1955 and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1964. 60
This rapid rise of Japan, from the ashes of defeat at
the end of World War II to economic leader, did not go
unnoticed in Moscow. While earlier leaders like Brezhnev and
his rapid successors did not attempt to normalize relations
with Japan, Gorbachev recognized the need to copy some of the
examples Japan had set. However, Gorbachev mistakenly
believed it would be possible to implement these changes
without turning away from socialism.
59 George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, The Coming War
With Japan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 328.
60 Reischauer, pp. 317-319
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E. JAPANESE-SOVIET TRADE DURING THE COLD WAR
Japanese trade with the Soviet Union during the Cold War
was practically non-existent until the beginning of the 1970s.
During the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-75), numerous
compensation agreements were agreed upon by the two countries.
Some of the impetus came from the Oil Crisis of 1973; another
deciding factor was extremely pragmatic-the Japanese wanted
market share and access to raw resources which they do not
possess. While Europeans were concentrating on trade with the
European sections of the Soviet Union, Japan and the United
States were concentrating on the Eastern and Western parts of
Siberia and the Soviet Far East. fal
The Japanese used compensation agreements in their
dealings with the Soviets; a quite attractive way of doing
business from their perspective. In return for agreeing to
supply the Soviets with heavy equipment on liberal credit
terms, the Japanese received contracts from the Soviets for
other equipment the Soviets needed. To repay the loan, the
Soviets provided Japan with raw materials that it needed to
fuel its export-driven economy. As Mathieson points out in
his analysis of Japan's role in Soviet growth
61 Raymond S. Mathieson, Japan's Role in Soviet Economic
Growth: Transfer of Technology Since 1965 (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1979), pp. 1-11. While the date on this
publication would appear to make it obsolete, such is not the
case. The author had access to classified documents which
show much of the information presented is still current;
however, since this is an open source document, it will be
used as a reference vice classified data.
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(m) ost Western countries, including Japan, find such
compensation deals attractive. The deferred credit,
frequently granted on a government-sponsored bank to bank
basis, insures that it can sell its industrial goods to
the Soviet Union, sometimes in huge quantities, on
favorable terms. On the other hand, the compensation deal
insures that in future years Japan will receive raw
materials or other products in repayment of its original
loans.... The real benefits obtained in terms of assured
supplies of raw materials from Soviet sources and the huge
expansion of Soviet markets for Japanese technological
plant and equipment have proved phenomenal. 62
A sampling of the raw materials the Japanese received during
the 70s and 80s as a result of these agreements show the types
of materials the Japanese needed to fuel their industry:
lumber, wood chips, iron ore, coal, liquified natural gas,
wood pulp and various types of non-ferrous metals. Also, the
Japanese entered into some agreements with the U.S. to help
develop oil and natural gas fields in the Siberian and Soviet
Far East regions of the country with a specified percentage of
extractions earmarked for delivery to Japan at bargain
prices . b3
These dealings slowed in the 1980s and until recently
appeared to be dying a slow death. The reasons for the
decline in trade seem due to the Japanese finding other
markets, and the continuing dispute over the Kurile Islands.
When the Soviets felt they were not getting a deal to their
liking, they resorted to veiled threats that they would offer
the project to other countries, like Germany or France. The
62 Ibid, pp. 14-16.
63 Mathieson, pp. 12-29
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results of such threats proved frustrating to both sides, as
can be seen from the following observation
(t)hese unsuccessful negotiations mark a characteristic
capriciousness in Russian ' on-again-off -again' planning.
For the Japanese, it represents a costly and frustrating
waste of time in preparation of feasibility studies and
long, finally abortive, negotiations. 64
Attempts to bring the Kurile Islands into the discussion
of business by the Japanese brought about much consternation
and resentment on the part of the Russians. The pattern was
to
. . .gain political advantage while commercial negotiations
and compensation deals are under negotiation. A frequent
Japanese negotiating strategy is that agreements would
proceed much more smoothly if the Soviet Union would
recognize the Japanese claim to sovereignty over four
northern islands ... [and the issue] was settled to Japan's
satisfaction 65
While this tactic was unsuccessful for the Japanese, because
of the intransigence of the Soviets, the next chapter will
look at the movement that was made under Gorbachev. While
nothing concrete was obtained, at least the position of the
Soviets was eased enough that there could be discussion of the
islands, albeit along the now familiar lines of "land for
money .
"
64 Ibid, p. 23 .
65 Mathieson, p. 22.
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F. SUMMARY
While the relationship between the two countries has been
marked by tension, and at times, armed conflict, this has not
kept the two from dealing with one another in the commercial
arena. Even under the Communists, the Japanese were active in
trade and development of natural resources in those regions of
the Soviet Union from which the Japanese could derive some
benefit
.
Dealing in a characteristically pragmatic manner, when the
benefits derived were outweighed by the amount of time and
money invested, the Japanese quietly withdrew from some of
their business dealings with the Soviet Union; however, they
never completely abandoned the area. This is probably due to
two factors. First, the Japanese wanted to keep any avenue
available open that might lead to the return of territory they
feel is rightfully theirs. Second, being pragmatic business
people, the Japanese were unwilling to allow themselves to be
completely shut out of any potential market, especially one
that possesses the mineral and raw material wealth of the
Siberian and Far East regions of the Soviet Union.
The actions of the Soviet Union during this period were
often contradictory. While professing a desire to be a
friendly force in the Pacific, the Soviets conducted a build-
up of Soviet nuclear and conventional capabilities in the
Pacific, using the Sea of Okhotsk as the base for its SSBNs.
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The Japanese quite naturally were apprehensive about this
buildup so close to their shores, especially when the
intentions of the Soviets were so unclear. Soviet policy in
the area mirrored their military actions. While attempting to
separate the U.S. and Japan, the Soviets, by virtue of their
military buildup, ensured the Japanese would be driven closer
to the United States, not further away. Even while engaging
in economic relations with Japan, the Soviets refused to
negotiate the status of the Kuriles. By taking this stand,
the Soviets cut themselves off from one of the only country
interested in investing in the Russian Far East. When the oil
crisis passed, so did all but a cursory interest by the
Japanese in investing in the Soviet Union. Finally, the
Soviets could see a former enemy had moved past them
economically, a fact that elicited both envy and fear. The
Japanese, a small island country of Asians, was more
technologically advanced than one of the world's nuclear
superpowers. Adding to the fear, the Japanese were closely
aligned with the Soviet Union's "enemy," the United States.
Something needed to change. Gorbachev, recognizing this, set
about to become part of the "Pacific Century." The next two
chapters will address the changes brought about by Gorbachev
in Russia, and the many possibilities that have arisen as a
result of the failed coup and the rise of Yeltsin.
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IV. GORBACHEV: NEW THINKING AND NEW HOPES
A. NEW LEADER, NEW IDEAS, LITTLE CHANGE
Soon after becoming General Secretary of the CPSU, Mikhail
Gorbachev met with Japan's Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone
and assured him that a different view of Japan would emerge in
his administration. 66 This change in attitude toward Japan
was one that Gorbachev was to follow in "fits and starts"
throughout his tenure without much of the success and
assistance that he hoped to achieve. This chapter will examine
the initiatives proposed by Gorbachev, his ability to carry
through on them and the Japanese reaction to them. It is
instructive to examine this phase of Russian-Japanese
relations closely since this was the first time since the
abortive talks in the mid-fifties that a Soviet leader had
indicated any progress might be possible on the Kurile Islands
question. The initiatives that Gorbachev attempted to put
forward form a blueprint that might be followed by Boris
Yeltsin, if he is to be more successful than his predecessor
in getting the Japanese to reinvest in the Russian Far East.
66 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "Japanese Perceptions and Policies
Toward the Soviet Union: Changes and Prospects Under the
Gorbachev Era, " in The Soviet Union and the Asia-Pacific
Region: Views From the Region, ed. Pushpa Thambipillai and
Daniel C. Matuszewski (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 28-9.
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While Gorbachev made numerous changes in the people who
represented the Soviet Union, his position on the Kuriles
remained, with few exceptions, the same as that of his
predecessors. Contact between Soviet and Japanese diplomats
was increased under Gorbachev; additionally, Eduard
Shevardnadze, Gorbachev's selection as Foreign Minister,
oversaw a reformation of the Foreign Ministry that reflected
the new importance of Japan to the Soviets' "new thinking."
Less than one year after Gorbachev assumed power,
Shevardnadze became the first Soviet Foreign Minister to visit
Japan in ten years. The Japanese lost no time in raising the
one issue that dominated their relationship- the Kurile
Islands. The answer the Japanese received was mixed. While
Shevardnadze agreed to discussed the issue's "unresolved
questions," he also reiterated the common Soviet theme that
the Soviet position "had been resolved.
"
b7 This seemingly
contradictory position did not completely disappoint the
Japanese; they were content to get the Soviets to admit to the
"unresolved questions," believing this could be used as a
springboard in future talks
.
Proof of the Japanese acceptance of the new Soviet
position on the Kuriles came when Foreign Minister Abe visited
Moscow four months later in May 1986. During this visit, the
Committee for Cooperation on Science and Technology was
67 Hasegawa, pp. 2 9-30.
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reestablished. In return, Japanese citizens were given
permission to visit the graves of relatives located in the
Kuriles. 68 While these developments were going on, many in
the West wondered about Gorbachev's purpose in turning to the
East. The answer was not long in coming.
1. The Vladivostok Speech
In his speech in Vladivostok in July 1986, Gorbachev
made clear his intent to re-emphasize the Soviet Far East and
its development. While the majority of the speech concerned
Soviet-Asian relations in a general way, it did address the
Japanese question.
On relations with Japan. There are emerging signs of a
turn for the better here as well. It would be good if the
turn did take place. The objective position of our two
countries in the world demands profound cooperation on a
sound, realistic basis, in a calm atmosphere free from the
problems of the past. A beginning was made this year.
The foreign ministers exchanged visits. On the agenda is
an exchange of top-level visits.
Economic cooperation is of mutual interest. The point at
issue is, first of all, our coastal regions, which already
have business contacts with Japanese firms. It is
possible to discuss the question of establishing joint
enterprises in adjacent and nearby regions of the USSR and
Japan. Why not establish long-term cooperation in the
investigation and comprehensive use of the ocean's
resources? Why not link up the programs concerning the
peaceful study and use of outer space? The Japanese, it
seems, have a method of making relations more dynamic,
68 Ni Xiaoquan, "Gorbachev's Policy Toward the Asia-
Pacific Region, " in The Soviet Union and the Asia-Pacific
Region: Views from the Region, op. cit., pp. 19-2 0. Hasegawa
also mentions these developments in his article.
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called "economic diplomacy." Let it serve Soviet-Japanese
cooperation this time. 69
Obviously, this was a plea by Gorbachev for the Japanese to
return to the area it had abandoned in the early 80s, the
Soviet Far East. However, Japan's interest in the area had
ebbed because of soured business dealings and a loss of need
for the oil and gas present there due to the restructuring of
the Japanese business structure.
If it was Gorbachev's intent and belief that the
Japanese would come with open wallets to reinvest in this
region, he would have been better advised to have omitted the
use of the code words "problems of the past." As one Japanese
observer noted, the use of such a term was a Soviet code for
the Northern Territories. 70
Implicit in his speech was a recognition by Gorbachev
that while the Soviet Union had become a military superpower
in the region, it did not have the economic capability to go
with that military power. In fact, the expansion of Soviet
power had made its neighbors wary of Soviet intentions in the
region. Just as he was doing in Europe, Gorbachev was
attempting to alleviate the concerns of his neighbors.
1 Mikhail Gorbachev, speech delivered at the Ceremonial
Meeting Devoted to the Presentation of the Order of Lenin to
Vladivostok. (Vladivostok Speech, hereafter.), 28 July 1986.
Found in Robert A. Manning, Asian Policy: The New Soviet
Challenge in the Pacific (New York: Priority Press
Publications, 1988), p. 111.
70 Susumu Awanohara, Far Eastern Economic Review, 13
November 1986, p. 16.
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The obvious question arises as to why he had
undertaken and was ready to further reduce forces in the
region? Bilveer Singh suggests three reasons: 1) to have the
Soviet Union seen in a new light; 2) to have U.S. policies in
the area put on the defensive; and, 3) to disrupt the
strategic stability and regional balance of power. 71
As Singh points out, the reduction of military force
was a calculated risk that would make Gorbachev unpopular with
the military, yet show the strength of his reform movement,
not only to the Soviet citizenry, but also to the world at
large. Singh also points to a major problem for the U.S. in
the future, now that the Cold War has ended and the old
alliances are being reexamined. He contends that since
...the United States is not a geographical Asian power
while the Soviet Union is, may mean that the days of the
United States as the leading Asian power are over while
those of the Soviet Union are just beginning. 7J
While this observation was made in context of the initiatives
by Gorbachev, it seems unlikely that any growth in Russian
stature in the region might come at the expense of the United
States. Given the decline in Japanese interest in the area
and the lack of movement on the Kurile Islands, facts which
Singh seems to ignore, there would need to be many changes in
71 Bilveer Singh, "The Asia-Pacific in the Era of Reduced
Soviet Military Presence," Issues and Studies, 26, no. 9
(1990)
, pp. 74-78.
72 Ibid, p. 76.
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Russian policies before the Japanese would consider turning
away from the United States.
The Asian model could be followed by Russia, in
modernizing her economy. Contrary to a common perception in
the United States, the Pacific Dragons' economies are not
based on the unfettered free market idea. They are semi-
planned economies, just not centrally planned ones. Marshall
Goldman, a noted economist who specializes in analyzing the
economy of Russia, notes
(t)here is a danger that American observers of the Soviet
system may be so blinded by their own circumstances that
they cannot imagine different models of technological
development. Other somewhat planned economies , such as
those of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, are leaders in
advanced technology, but their planning systems are not as
centrally determined as the Soviet system. The Asians
have been able to combine broad planning with private
enterprise. Although their enterprises have many more
checks and controls than do large American companies, they
nonetheless have provided for a flexibility and speed that
are missing from the cumbersome Soviet system. 7i
From this statement, one can see that Gorbachev was attempting
to loosen some of the controls the Gosplan and Gosbank exerted
on the Soviet economy and allow it to grow while maintaining
the tenets of socialism. He was tentatively following the
Asian model while seeking to preserve socialism. While he
failed in his effort to preserve socialism, the overall goal
of following the Asian economic model remains a good one- one
that Yeltsin could follow.
73 Marshall Goldman, Gorbachev' s Challenge (New York: W.W
Norton and Co., 1987), p. 101. (Italics added).
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Returning to the Vladivostok speech, other analysts
noted another concern addressed by Gorbachev in the speech:
Japan's reemergence as a regional military power and its place
in U.S. strategy for the region. When Ronald Reagan assumed
office in the United States, a new policy in the Pacific
emerged, one that emphasized and required a more active role
for the JDF and JMSDF . Also, the Japanese had, since the late
70s begun to improve relations with China; this was a reversal
of previous Japanese policy which attempted to keep a
balanced, distant relationship from both countries. Gorbachev
could see the improvement in the economy of China, partly as
a result of Japanese investment and sought to share in that
improvement. While the main reasons for China's economic
advance was agricultural reforms and a loosening of controls,
Gorbachev was not ready to go that far. It was part of
Gorbachev's attempt to have the Russian people stress their
pocketbooks over calls for democracy that had arisen as a
result of glasnost and perestroika.
Unfortunately for Gorbachev, there were a few key
events that kept him from getting the Japanese to invest
heavily in the Soviet Far East. As cautiously happy as the
Japanese were with the new Soviet face, they were still
unwilling to change in any fundamental way their relationship
with the United States and the West. Gorbachev's calls for
the Japanese not to participate in the U.S.'s Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) went unheeded. When the Japanese
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announced they would assist with SDI research in September
1986," the Soviet press pronounced the move as "Japanese
militarism. " 74
The next crisis to erupt was the Toshiba incident, 7S
which resulted in closer controls by the Japanese on exports
to Communist bloc countries. The incident also led to
denunciations in the U.S. Congress and fueled more "Japan
bashing" by congressmen- an action that played well with their
constituencies, but upset the Japanese. 76 Finally, the
Soviets and Japanese closed out the year with a spy scandal
which resulted in both countries expelling diplomats.
Having been unsuccessful in his first attempt to get
Japan to begin to reinvest in the Russian Far East, Gorbachev
proposed a two-track program in 1988. Manning suggests that
Gorbachev's intent was to intensify
the search for a compromise formula that would resolve the
territorial issue in such a way that both sides could live
with it. 77
74 Manning, p . 57
.
75 Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., Trading Places: How We Are
Giving Our Future to Japan and How to Reclaim It (New York:
Basic Books, Inc., 1988), pp. 374-376. When a U.S. submarine
was pinged by a Soviet submarine in 1986, an investigation led
to the disclosure that Toshiba, along with its Norwegian
partner, had sold propeller milling technology to the Soviet
Union. Prestowitz points out that in addition to showing the
lax attitude of the Japanese government toward its industries,
this event was also a result of the loss of this industry in
the United States.
76 Manning, p. 57
77 Ibid, p. 59
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Another analyst believes that Gorbachev had three goals when
he began his drive toward a new Asian policy. These were
reducing the threat to Soviet security posed by the
People's Republic of China, the United States and its
allies; developing closer political relations with all
countries in the region, regardless of ideological
orientation, through a new flexibility in resolving
longstanding disputes with the PRC, Japan, and South
Korea; and establishing more organic links to the dynamic
regional economic order, in order to accelerate the reform
process within the USSR. Economic cooperation with
nations of east Asia and the Pacific region is viewed by
the Soviet leadership as an important stimulus to
perestroika . . . 78
If one of Gorbachev's goals was to reduce the perceived threat
to Soviet security, his emphasis should have been on reducing
the perceived Soviet threat in the Pacific. His calls in
Vladivostok for a different security alignment only made the
Japanese suspicious and resulted in their cooperation on SDI
research. It was ludicrous to expect other nations in the
region to accept a Soviet call for new security arrangements
when fully one-quarter of Soviet armed forces were in the Far
East. 79
78 Charles E. Ziegler, "Soviet Strategies for Development:
East Asia and the Pacific Basin," Pacific Affairs, 63, #4
(1990-91)
, p. 451.
Xiaoquan, p. 16. Xiaoquan is also another source who
believes that the Soviet Pacific Fleet became the largest in
the Soviet Navy during the 1980s. He also points out that
this military power was never translated into prestige in the




Sensing that he was losing the impetus started by his
Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev tried to regain the high ground
by putting forth new proposals during a visit to Krasnoyarsk
in September 1988. Gorbachev called attention to the horrible
conditions in the Far East and Siberia; he called again for
economic cooperation; he said again, as in Vladivostok, that
the Soviet Union wanted to join the Pacific Economic
Cooperation Conference. Additionally, he said that proposals
to encourage foreign investment in the Far East were in
preparation. 80
One of the proposals being suggested was Free Economic
Zones (FEZ) . In his speech, Gorbachev said that in these
zones there would be "a preferential system for tariffs,
licensing of foreign economic transactions, and taxation. 81
Once again though, Gorbachev had started into motion a
proposal that was going to raise the ire of the military. The
primary city that Gorbachev wanted to use for these new FEZs
was Vladivostok, home to the Soviet Pacific Fleet. When a
conference was held in Vladivostok in October 1988,
representatives of 36 nations were touring through the city
80 Zeigler, p. 453 .
81 Scott Atkinson, "The USSR and the Pacific Century, "
Asian Survey, 30, #7 (1990), p. 630. A text of the Krasnoyarsk
speech that deals with the foreign policy initiatives appears
in "News and Views from the USSR, " Soviet Embassy Information
Department (Washington, D.C.) 19 September 1988, pp. 1-11.
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taking pictures of the fleet. Besides upsetting the navy,
Gorbachev's proposals also upset the party apparatchiks who
feared a lessening of their power if these new FEZs were
allowed to be established. With opposition from these two
powerful forces, this proposal was doomed to failure. SJ
There was, however, a second city that was proposed
for FEZ status that did not meet with such opposition, and, in
fact, also appealed to the Japanese, Nakhodka. This city was
already established as a port at which foreign ships called
frequently; in addition, Japan had links to Nakhodka through
two channels: fishing and cruise lines. 83 The Japanese were
also interested in Khasan, located near the North Korean
border, as a automobile production area and for producing
high-grade commodities. 84 There was a recognition by others
besides Gorbachev that only by turning eastward could the
Soviet Union hope to achieve its goals of restructuring the
bankrupt Socialist system; unfortunately, as became apparent
as the end neared for Gorbachev, he never recognized the need
to abandon socialism. He continued to hold to the belief that
he could reform the system without sweeping it away. Among
the supporters of this limited eastward view was Yevgeniy
Primakov, who observed that
82 Ibid, pp. 631-3.
83 Atkinson, p . 633 .
84 Ibid, p. 633.
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(t)he Pacific region has become the center of world
development Today it is demonstrating the most rapid
rates of economic growth and scientific-technical
progress. I am not talking only about Japan or the West
coast of the United States but also about the so-called
"economic tigers " -South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong
Kong. Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia are developing
rapidly. A state's strength is determined less and less
by its military power alone. 85
Gorbachev, and others, recognized the riches that were in the
Far East; they also recognized the only hope of getting this
area developed was to rely on outside investment . Any hope of
tapping this potential depended on the Soviets gaining access
to the technology of the West and Pacific Rim. As one
observer put it
(r)eaching a modus vivendi with Japan will probably be
Gorbachev's greatest single challenge in East Asia. He
wants technological assistance from Japan in order to
develop Siberia, and if the Soviet Union intends to join
the dynamic Pacific economy he needs Japan's support. 86
B. JAPAN'S REACTION TO GORBACHEV'S OVERTURES
Despite these attempts by the Soviets to gain access to
Pacific Rim technology, especially from Japan, Gorbachev's
level of success was minimal . The Japanese clung to their old
position-no change on the islands, no real investment.
Gorbachev made known his wish to be the first Soviet leader to
visit Japan; Japan made it known that while they welcomed such
85 Quoted in Atkinson, p. 636.
86 Donald S. Zagoria, "Soviet Policy in East Asia: The
Quest for Constructive Engagement," The Korean Journal of
Defense Analysis, 2, #1 (1990), 12.
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a visit, the Kurile Islands would dictate what degree of
success such a visit could hope to achieve. In any event,
during this period, Japanese interest in investing in the
Russian Far East had tapered off since the 70s. In fact,
among several hundred joint ventures the Soviets. . .signed,
Japan's share is only a meager five-a good indication that




The Japanese also continued to resent the treatment they had
received during the time Gromyko was Soviet Foreign Minister.
These factors, coupled with a desire not to upset their
relationship with the United States kept Japan from
enthusiastically responding to either Gorbachev's Vladivostok
or Krasnoyarsk proposals.
Harry Gelman points out that perhaps the Japanese believed
that if they continued to be hesitant in their response that
Gorbachev would continue to move toward their position on the
Kurile Islands and Soviet military presence in the Pacific
Rim. He also believes the Japanese knew they were only
getting
cosmetic concessions in place of geopolitical retreats.
Gorbachev has indeed been extremely active in extending
pallatives to Tokyo; one gets the impression that his
advisers have been tasked to compile lists of concession
that might be made to Japan on inessentials. . . .He has
himself met with Japanese political and business leaders,
and has opened up the Soviet media to statement of the
Japanese point of view. He has sent platoons of academics
to Tokyo to cultivate the Japanese elite.... He has made
Symbolic gestures such as allowing visits by Japanese to
grave sites in the Northern Territories. He has stopped
87 Ibid, p. 14.
insisting that the Northern Territories are a non-
issue ....
But up to now he has not yielded on the two issues that
matter to Japan. He has refused to reduce the military
posture adjacent to Japan that Japan regards as
threatening, and he has refused to return the Northern
Territories. Instead, he has continued to seek to get the
Japanese to agree to improve the atmosphere of the
relationship and to expand trade and investment in the
Soviet Union in the absence of settlement of these
issues . 88
Whether the Japanese knew Gorbachev's proposals were only
cosmetic or not, their minimal reaction to them does show
their ability to wait over the long term to allow a situation
to work in their favor. This pragmatic approach to both
business and politics, as well as the resource wealth of the
Russian Far East, will be discussed in Chapter VI.
C. GORBACHEV'S APRIL 1991 VISIT TO JAPAN
From April 16-19, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev and then Prime
Minister Toshiki Kaifu met in Tokyo in historic meetings. The
stage for this visit had been under construction since
Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech; the final plank was set down
during a visit by Foreign Minister Uno to the Soviet Union in
May 1989. It was during this visit that Japan played its
first card in response to all of Gorbachev's initiatives. A
proposal was made that involved
88 Harry Gelman, Policy Implications : A Strategy for the
West: The Causes and Effects of Gorbachev's Far East
Behavior, April 1990. An unpublished manuscript used with
permission of the author. (Emphasis added).
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improving trust, stepping up trade, cultural and
scientific exchanges, and convening summit meetings with
the aim of solving the Northern Territories question and
concluding a peace treaty. 89
Once these ground rules were established that the Kurile
Islands would be central to any improvement in relations,
plans were made for Gorbachev's visit. When, in January 1991,
the Soviets made a request for a top Japanese government
official, the LDP Secretary-General, Ichiro Ozawa, went to
Moscow to discuss details of the upcoming visit. The Japanese
were even more blunt with their proposal- " economic assistance
in exchange for the return of the islands." 90 The timing of
the Japanese could not have been worse.
The Ozawa proposal, coupled with Japanese press reports
suggesting this was a plan for the return of the islands,
caused an uproar in Moscow. Conservatives in the Soviet
government and a substantial portion of the public protested
what they saw as a selling of territory for money and the
promise of further financial aid. To them, it was a sign of
weakness and they exploited it to full advantage against
Gorbachev. During the March 17 referendum on whether to keep
the Union or not, another poll was taken to assess public
89 Kunio Nishimura, "The Very Beginning, " Look Japan, July
1991, p. 9. This article was an interview with Takehiro Togo,
ambassador for Hokkaido at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
discussing Japanese-Soviet relations in the wake of
Gorbachev's visit.
90 Ken'ichi Iida, "Disappointed But Determined," Look
Japan, July 19 91, p. 5.
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reaction to the possible sale of the islands. The results
were a disaster not only for Gorbachev, but also dealt a blow
to the Japanese and confronted them with evidence of how badly
they had bungled an important foreign policy initiative. Over
70% of the Soviet public opposed the deal. In addition to
conservative opponents, Boris Yeltsin also opposed the sale,
but on different terms. He advanced the belief that the
islands were Russian territory, not Soviet, and as such, it
was up to him to negotiate any deals concerning their
possession with the Japanese and not Gorbachev's. 41 This
development ultimately kept both Gorbachev and the Japanese
from achieving their respective goals.
In his speech before the Japanese Parliament, Gorbachev
was able to answer one of the primary Japanese concerns,
namely Soviet military power in the Pacific. He outlined
Soviet compliance with the INF Treaty and the downsizing of
the Soviet forces in the Far East. He also made it clear the
Soviets were willing to "begin concrete dialogue with Japan on
military issues." 92 Gorbachev, in spite of the uproar in the
91 Steven R. Weisman, "No Offers of Billions to Soviets,
Tokyo Says," The New York Times, National Edition, 15 April
1991, Sec. A, p. 5, col. 1. The Iida article in Look Japan
also covers portions of this internal Soviet debate over the
islands
.
92 Mikhail Gorbachev, "USSR Foreign Relations With Japan:
A Peaceful World Order Depends on Perestroika, " Vital
Speeches, 57, no. 15, p. 454. This is a transcript of the




Soviet Union, still made mention of the Kurile Islands;
however, what he had to say on the issue could not have
pleased his audience.
We are interested in linking the economy of the Far East
and Siberia to the economic complex forming in the Asia-
Pacific region. Being aware of the difficulties, we also
see enormous opportunities. . .
.
There were many things between our countries that left
bitter memories in the hearts and minds of both peoples.
What can be done? One can continue to dwell on the past
and nurse grudges
.
But this is futile. It is necessary to choose a different
road- to reconsider the common past for the sake of the
present and the future....
Soviet people are grateful to the Japanese for their care
of the graves of Russian soldiers on Japanese land. I
assure you that our people will care in the same way for
the graves of Japanese on our land. 93
Just as he had used "code words" in his Vladivostok speech
regarding the Kurile Islands, Gorbachev's use of the
possessive when speaking of the graves on the islands
aggravated his hosts.
In spite of the lack of movement on the Kurile Islands
question, Japanese press reports indicate that movement was
made by some to begin economic relations with the Soviet Far
East. There also seems to be a realization that regardless of
what the future of Gorbachev and perestroika might have been,
the Japanese were missing an opportunity if they did not
establish some relations with those areas of the Soviet Union
93 Gorbachev, p. 455. (emphasis added;
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closest to Japan. Indicative of this opinion is the following
assessment
(i)f on the other hand, perestroika is given a new lease
on life and the trend toward market reform and multiparty
politics continues, then the Soviet Far East will most
certainly head the movement since, geographically, it is
well-situated for economic exchange with China, North and
South Korea and Japan. Unlike the Baltics or the
Caucasus, the Soviet Far East has not confronted the
central government, and in the absence of friction, it is
free to pursue trade with other Asian economies.
Furthermore, the Soviet Far East is rich in oil and
natural gas. 94
Comments such as this showed a desire to not be left out of
any economic development of the region. Once again, the
pragmatic side of the Japanese was being revealed. There were
also calls for Japan to pay attention to that area of the
country that faced the Sea of Japan, or as it is called, the
"back." Niigata, the closest Japanese prefecture to a
proposed Sea of Japan Economic Zone, held a Eastern Siberia
Trade Fair in April 1991 at which $13.5 million dollars of
contracts were made. Additionally, there were some who voiced
the belief that because of the weak industries in those areas
of the Russian Far East proposed for development that Japan
would need to initiate investment in them. Kazuo Ogawa, Vice-
Director of the Institute for Soviet and East European
Economic Studies, voiced the belief that
94 Yutaka Akino, "East of Eden," Look Japan, July 1991,
p. 11.
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(u)p to now, Japan has concentrated on trade with the U.S.
Turning toward the previously ignored Japan Sea region can
only be productive. 95
Ambassador Togo also noted that several local Japanese
governments were making independent contact with the Russian
Far East and welcomed the moves, especially since he expected
the Russians to use Hokkaido as their entrance to Japan. 96
D. SUMMARY
Gorbachev achieved modest success with his initiatives
toward the Pacific Rim and Japan, and must be credited with
changing the Russian side of the dialogue from one of
intransigence to one of actual negotiation. The Japanese must
shoulder some of the blame for the failure of any real
progress on the Kurile Islands during Gorbachev's visit to
Japan since their press reports of Ozawa ' s trip were
instrumental in fermenting protest against any bargaining on
the islands question in the Soviet Union. Consequently,
Gorbachev used the possessive when speaking about the islands
to the Parliament.
The Japanese were also given insight on the views of the
person they must deal with now if they are to gain the return
of the Kurile Islands, Boris Yeltsin. While Gorbachev
initially looked to the Far East, especially Japan, for
95 Quoted in an untitled article by Miyuki Mmeshige in
Look Japan, July 1991, p. 6.
96 Nishimura, p . 9 .
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economic reasons, he also understood that if he could improve
the Soviet economy it would also strengthen his political
standing. If he could achieve success on these two fronts, it
would be possible to address the mutual security concerns of
both countries. Gorbachev recognized this would be the
hardest area to reform since any change in Soviet military
stature in the Pacific would be resisted. Gorbachev, however,
was still pursuing the old Soviet goal of separating Japan
from the U.S.; he just wanted to use economics and "new
political thinking" instead of the failed policy of military
coercion
.
Gorbachev also realized the failure of "old thinking" to
adequately develop the rich mineral resources of the Russian
Far East. Initially promising, the meager return on
investment coupled with the declining level of new investment
in the area required an infusion of Gorbachev's "new
thinking," even if the goal was the same. There was also an
attitude of disbelief and palatable racism in Moscow that an
Asian country like Japan had achieved such success in the
economic arena. If it was true Japan had the second most
powerful economy in the world, what future did this hold for
the Soviet Union? Gorbachev realized dramatic action was
necessary. He saw a country, like his, that operated under
what was essentially one-party rule; however, Gorbachev's
reluctance to put aside socialism would keep him from truly
reforming the Soviet economy.
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In the next chapter, Yeltsin's views will be addressed.
The potential of the Russian East Asian region will be
examined, as well as the views of the Japanese in the post-
coup era.
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V. THE POST-COUP ERA: BORIS YELTSIN AND THE RUSSIAN FAR
EAST
With the passing of Gorbachev from power and the
subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union, the Japanese had to
start negotiations anew with a new leader. Many of the
circumstances have not changed. The Russians still want and
desperately need economic assistance if they are to come into
the community of economically developed nations. There is a
recognition on the part of the Russians and the other members
of the CIS that in order to get this assistance they will have
to accede to the terms dictated by the countries providing the
aid. The Russian Far East and Siberia are still the key to
the economic development of Russia because that is where most
of the mineral wealth is located.
If Russia follows through on the terms of the Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) , the Japanese will have removed
from their backdoor a threat that has been present since the
end of World War II. This will also, as a result, give them
more freedom in their dealings with the United States. One
reason for their bilateral security arrangement with the U.S.
will be gone- the Soviet Union and the Soviet military menace.
In this chapter, Japan's struggle to formulate a policy in
response to the coup will be examined. Yeltsin's attitude on
the return of the Kurile Islands will also be addressed.
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A. YELTSIN TAKES OVER
As Boris Yeltsin assumed power, the Japanese could take
some comfort in the fact that they already were aware of his
position on the islands. Contrasting with his remarks that
Gorbachev had no right to negotiate with the Japanese
regarding the question, Yeltsin had previously outlined a
five-step program for the return of the Kurile Islands to the
Japanese. In 1990, Yeltsin visited Japan and suggested the
following
first, and foremost ,... recognize that the problem exists
and return two of the smaller islands. Second, the large
islands should be demilitarized. In a third phase they
should be opened to development by free enterprise. Then
a peace treaty should be signed. And, in a fifth and last
stage, a decade or more down the road, the two islands
might be put under a joint protectorate or granted free-
territorial status or disposed of in some other mutually
acceptable fashion. 97
There has, to date, been no attempt to put this plan into
effect by Yeltsin; however, it must be noted that his
attention has been focused on trying to keep the CIS together
and implementing his economic reform package. In fact, in
February 1992, he told Prime Minister Miyazawa that he would
be unable to visit Japan until at least September 1992 because
of the press of domestic problems. This disappointed the
Japanese, who had hoped for an earlier visit; yet, they also
realize they can take a slow approach to the situation since
97 Legvold, p. 140.
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they feel that ultimately the outcome of the Kurile Islands
question will be in their favor. 98
Just as Yeltsin has been struggling to consolidate his
power, the Japanese, like the rest of the West, have been
struggling to form a plan for dealing with the new governments
in Russia. While Japan recognizes it will have to take a
leadership role, due to its economic standing, it also
believes that the timing of such assistance must be done
carefully for both practical and political reasons. 9 ' The
Japanese have also voiced the fear that Yeltsin could become
an "autocratic ruler of an ultra-nationalistic Russia." 100
The debate in Japan over aid to Russia and the CIS is,
predictably, divided into two factions. One feels that absent
a strong government organization any aid would be useless
since it is impossible to determine to whom the aid should be
directed. Keitaro Hasegawa, an economic commentator, speaks
for this faction with the observation that to extend aid at
this time is risky. On the other side of the debate, Tadao
Morimoto, a specialist on the Russian economy at the Toray
Research Institute, feels that since Russia lacks capital that
it is necessary to support the embryonic democracy in Russia.
98 Steven R. Weisman, "Dispute Over Seized Islands is
Delaying Japanese Aid to Russia, " The New York Times, National
Edition, 7 February 1992, Sec. A, p. 6, col. 3.
99 Akihiko Tanaka, "Unwilling Donor, " Look Japan, November
1991, p. 19.
100 Ibid, p. 19.
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Both of these men represent the extreme left and right in
Japan. Taking a more centrist view, Toyo University professor
of Russian politics, Yunosuke Okura, supports the careful
dispensing of aid, and believes Japan must provide
humanitarian aid, as needed. However, his reason for
supporting such aid is not out of any humanitarian concern, it
is, rather, to avoid criticism from its international
partners . 101
A more pragmatic Japanese view is expressed by Kenichi
Ito, a professor of international politics and economics at
Aoyama Gakuin. Professor Ito believes that
(t) hough Soviet need and pressure for assistance has
increased, Japan must make its own priorities. 102
He also believes that Japan can and should use its leverage to
ensure any aid given to Russia has a positive impact on the
Kurile Islands question and that the aid be given with a clear
understanding that it is tied to a resolution of the matter
that is favorable to Japan. In other words, he is advocating
that Japan in essence use any aid as a weapon to achieve its
long-awaited goal of regaining the territories. Such a
position puts Japan in conflict with Germany, the one country
that has been most vocal in its calls for rapid, substantial
aid to Russia. 103 Japan answers this criticism by claiming
101 Tanaka, p. 19.
102 Quoted in Tanaka, p. 19.
103 Tanaka, p. 19.
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that its resources are not endless and that it will not be
forced into investing in what it considers ill-advised and
"uneconomic projects." 104
B. ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST
Because of the lack of current, accurate information on
the Soviet Far East and Siberian mineral wealth, one must rely
on "best-guess" estimates of the true potential of these
areas. It has been estimated that approximately 90 percent of
all proven CIS energy reserves are located in either the
Russian Far East or Siberian areas (both East Siberia and West
Siberia) , as well as over seventy-five percent of the timber
and over two-thirds of other minerals, such as aluminum,
nickel, tin, platinum, gold and diamonds. 105' The Russian Far
East's share of energy production has been on a rapid climb
since the 1950s. For example, the following is a listing of
the Russian Far East's share of all Soviet energy production
from 1950-1979; the increases are remarkable. The Russian Far
East share of total coal production went from 26.5 percent to
3 6.9 percent; oil went from 2.6 percent to 48.8 percent; gas
104 Weisman, 7 Feb 92, p. 6.
105 These statistics are an amalgamation from several
sources, as will be the rest of the statistical data cited.
They are Thambipillai and Matuszewski, cited earlier; I.S.
Koropekyj and Gertrude E. Schroeder, ed., Economics of Soviet
Regions (New York: Praeger, 1981), and various issues of
Resources Policy: The International Journal of Minerals Policy
and Economics . As mentioned previously, these sources are
used rather than classified documents.
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went from 1.6 percent to 31.4 percent; and electrical
production went from 11.1 percent to 18.1 percent, while
hydroelectric production went from negligible to 85.5 percent
in 1975, the last year for which accurate estimates can be
found. 106
In January 1992, Russia granted an American-Japanese
consortium rights to explore for oil and natural gas off
Sakhalin Island. This is not the first time this area has
been targeted for exploitation; it is estimated the reserves
in this area total 700 million barrels of oil and over 14
trillion cubic feet of natural gas-one of the largest known
reserves of natural gas in the world107 This is one example
of the pragmatic attitude the Japanese and Americans now have
in their dealings with Russia; while the Kuriles and their
return is still a major obstacle to any large scale investment
in Russia, the Japanese are not about to let access to this
much energy be cornered entirely by an economic competitor.
This is also an testament to the economic power that Tokyo now
exercises, for as Sanger points out
the success of the venture will probably hinge on
financial assistance from Tokyo. But that assistance may,
106 Adapted from Leslie Dienes and Theodore Shabad, The
Soviet Energy System (Washington, D.C.: V.H. Winston and
Sons, 1979), pp. 46-47, 70-71, and 110-112.
107 David E. Sanger, "U.S. -Japan Group to Explore Big
Energy Field Off Siberia, " The New York Times, National
Edition, 29 January 1992, Sec. C, pp. 1 and 5, col. 1.
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in turn, depend in large part on the resolution of the
islands dispute. 108
Another area the Japanese are eyeing for its development
potential is the Yakutia gas field. This area, like the
Sakhalin Island oil and gas field has been the subject of
exploration and development since the 1973 Oil Crisis. In a
recent paper, Allen S. Whiting addressed the possibility of a
joint exploration of this area. He sees Russia, China, the
Koreas, and Japan as the benefactors. One of the stumbling
blocks that Whiting pointed to, other than the harsh climate
the field is located in, was the recent declaration of
sovereignty by the Yakut-Skaha republic. luy While this
declaration was intended to give the area control over the
export of its diamonds, it is easy to see that the issue of
whom to negotiate on drilling rights has now been further
complicated. Rather than wait for the political situation to
settle, Whiting proposes going ahead with the project, lest
the cost escalate in the interim, and that the World Bank
provide expertise and funding to allow the project to go
forward. n0
108 Ibid, p. 5
109 Alan S. Whiting, Yakutia Gas for a Northeast Energy
Consortium, 1992. A paper delivered at a conference sponsored
by the Institute of Global Concern (China) and the Center for
International Strategy, Technology, and Policy, Georgia
Institute of Technology, U.S.A. in Beijing, China, March 23-
25, 1992.
110 Ibid, p. 9.
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Another problem blocking a massive influx of aid and
investment to the Russian Far East is the fact that communists
still control the everyday workings in the area and have
thwarted any real attempts at economic revitalization
.
in
Valentin Fyodorov, the democratically elected leader in
Sahkanlin, has been blocked by communists who are still in his
administration. One critic, Pyotr Lyakutin, feels that
Fyodorov never really had a plan to develop the area and this
allowed the communists to blunt any other moves Fyodorov may
have attempted. An additional shortcoming by Fyodorov, as far
as the Japanese are concerned, is his militant attitude on the
Kuriles. Fyodorov was quoted as saying the islands "are ours
and will remain ours." n/ This attitude seems popular among
the people and is one more obstacle in the way of a resolution
of the Territories problem.
Both the obstacles to economic reform in Russia and a
return of the islands to Japan raise many questions. One is
whether or not the calls for an independent Russian Far
Eastern Republic are genuine or another attempt by the former
communists both to embarrass and block Yeltsin or to keep
power for themselves. Valery Butov, a Yeltsin aide, sees such
calls as a result of the latter and believes the people do not
much care to be independent as they wish to have jobs and
111 Sophie Quinn-Judge, "Hobbled by old habits," Far
Eastern Economic Review, 12 March 19 92, p. 16.
112 Ibid, p. 17.
74
economic independence. 113 This view certainly seems to have
merit-. A MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour broadcast on 27 March 1992
focused on the Russian Far East. Interviews with citizens in
the area mirrored a wish for economic renewal and not much of
a passion for independence. In reality, the Russian Far East
has seen some actions toward independence, such as in Yakutia;
however, such moves seem to come only in an attempt to ensure
control over the export of their mineral wealth. In the
Maritime provinces and on Sakhalin, control is not really the
problem; the main problem is figuring out who is going to
come forth with a viable plan.
As can be seen from these few examples, the Russian Far
East has many raw mineral riches that can be extracted for
hard currency, a definite need if Russia is to achieve
Yeltsin's economic program and if Russia is to meet the
demanding conditions set by the International Monetary Fund.
The $24 billion aid program announced by President Bush in
early 1992 has not been approved by the Congress at the time
of this writing (June 1992), and given the calls for economic
revitalization at home, may not be a top priority.
Additionally, the program has only grudging support from the
Japanese, who are beginning to resent both the expectation
that they fund the majority of such packages and the lack of
empathy on the part of Japan's Western partners for her
113 Ibid, p. 18.
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single-mindedness on the Territories question. Ito spoke to
this when he said in an interview
many Europeans, particularly Germans, are irritated by the
slow and cautious pace at which the Japanese approach
their relationship with the Soviet Union. It is based on
ignorance of the fundamental facts which form the
historical background of relations between the two
nations. The Japanese have thought and acted differently
than Europeans with regard to the Soviets not because of
differences in thinking but because they were placed under
different circumstances ... .What matters to Japan isj
justice and international law, upon which the new world!
order must be founded. 114
C. SUMMARY
Tadao Morimoto, senior advisor to Toray Corporate Business
Research, believes the Russian economy must hit bottom and
then a new Marshall Plan could be instituted which would be
drawn up by the major industrialized nations. He acknowledges
the problems that Boris Yeltsin is having in keeping his
reforms in place and having to periodically back off some of
the more stringent ones, actions that upset the IMF greatly,
and that this view may prevail; however, the cost of such an
action is uncertain. 115 The Japanese recognize the wealth of
114 Kunio Nishimura, "A Matter of Justice, " Look Japan,
February 1992, p. 4.
115 Tadao Morimoto, "The Price of Peace, " Look Japan,
January 1992, p. 3. Morimoto feels that until the imbalance
between the money supply and available goods in the macro-
economy is rectified no genuine reform in Russia can take
place. He also addresses the inabilities of the U.S. or
Germany to give any more money to Russia owing to their own
economic problems. Thus, by default, the task falls to Japan
which is willing to gamble before committing to a Marshall-
type plan.
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the area and are interested in gaining access to it, if for no
other reasons than to have a fallback in case of more Middle
East instability and to balance any actions by economic
competitors in the area. While the Kurile Islands remain at
the center of relations with Russia, the history of trade
between the two countries, even during the Cold War, shows the
Japanese to be pragmatic enough not to let that one issue
stand in the way of all business transactions.
Looking at the long term is a Japanese strength;
ultimately Tokyo believes the Kurile Islands will be returned.
The opportunities to be in on the ground floor of developing
the Russian Far East may only come around once; rather than be
shut out entirely, the Japanese will likely cooperate and
invest, even if only modestly. Japan's long term political
and economic interests suggest that money could be found to
invest in the Russian Far East. In fact, it is possible Japan
sees the area as a natural component of a Japanese-led Pacific
economic trading bloc.
The proximity of the Russian Far East to Japan, the
developing contacts between the area and northern Japanese
areas, like Hokaido, and the availability of investment
dollars in Japan favor Tokyo over Moscow in developing this
area. The possibility of Japanese development being favored
grows if the Russian Far East does secede from Russia.
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VI. RUSSO-JAPANESE-U.S. RELATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
FUTURE
A fundamental question that needs to be addressed is the
effect the end of the Cold War could have on U . S . -Japanese
relations. During the Cold War, the U. S . -Japanese
relationship was the key bilateral tie in the Pacific. If, in
the wake of the end of the Cold War, there were significant
changes to this relationship, it would have a significant
impact in the region, including Russia.
Concurrent with Japan's rise to economic prominence has
been a decline in U.S. economic performance and the subsequent
cry in the public sector for a change in relations with Japan.
The Enigma of Japanese Power by Karel van Wolferen was a
"cannon shot" work that is often cited as proof that the U.S.
is being deceived by the Japanese. Congress has also picked
up on the mood of some of the American populace and so-called
"Japan bashing" has become common. Are such actions
justified? What are the long-term costs? Should not the
United States look to itself for the origination of most of
its economic ills? In the post-Cold War era, America seems to
be searching for a new resolve, while still seeking to hold to
its leadership role. Hence, there are proclamations as the
U.S. is "the sole superpower" left in the world, always said
with the caveat that the word "military" is operative. This
chapter provides a brief overview of U. S . -Japanese relations
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since the end of the Cold War. Some of the problems
associated with the strains in the relationship will be
examined. An assessment is provided of what could happen if
strains lead to a breakdown in the U. S . -Japanese relationship,
especially if such a break brought about closer ties between
Japan and Russia. Finally, possible actions the United
States could take, in the wake of the changes in the world, to
both improve its relations with Japan and insure its influence
in the vital Pacific Rim area will be given.
A. END OF THE COLD WAR AND A NEED FOR CHANGE
A common thread through much of the writing on post-Cold
War U.S. policy in Asia, the Pacific Rim, or with Japan has
been "the foundations of the style and type of leadership
America previously exercised no longer exist." 116 During the
course of the Cold War, a shift in economic trade occurred in
the United States. American trade with the Asia-Pacific
region exceeds $300 billion dollars per year; a figure one-
third greater than trade with Europe. 117 Unfortunately, this
shift in trade toward the Pacific has not led to a truly
"Asian" policy formulation; rather, the U.S. has tended to try
116 Stephen W. Bosworth, "The United States and Asia,
"
Foreign Affairs, 71, no. 1 (1991/2), p. 113.
117 Richard H. Solomon, "US Relations with East Asia and
the Pacific: A New Era," U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 2,
no. 21 (27 May 1991), p. 384.
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and handle relations in Asia as it did in Europe, not
recognizing the need to have a unique policy.
In a report to Congress, Paul Wolfowitz made a point of
emphasizing the fact that Japan had agreed, ahead of schedule,
to enter into a new Host Nation Support agreement with the
U.S. which would result in Japan paying for 100% of utility
and 100% of Japanese labor costs for the next five years for
U.S. forces in Japan. 118 While this may keep the issue of
American forces in Japan on a back burner for a while, there
does appear to be a question that is being avoided. It was
put best by Ambassador Bosworth.
In the short term, political and budgetary pressures will
undoubtedly cause Washington to seek a larger contribution
from Japan toward the costs of the U.S. military
deployment there. But Japan is already paying virtually
all of the local costs of those U.S. forces, and some
Japanese are already asking: If Filipinos will not accept
a continued American military presence when the United
States is willing to pay them to do so, why should
Japanese accept a continued American deployment for which
Japan is expected to pay? 119
As the United States has lost economic standing in the
world and the Pacific Rim, there has been a corresponding loss
in U.S. political influence in the area. One of the major
measuring sticks for this loss of economic presence is to
examine American and Japanese contributions to Association of
118
"A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim:
Looking Toward the 21st Century, A report to Congress, 2 8
February 1991, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Of fice)
,
p. 5.
119 Bosworth, p. 117. (italics added).
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Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In 1980, investment by the
U.S. and Japan was $5 billion and $7 billion, respectively.
By 1989, U.S. investment was $10 billion, the same figure as
in 1986; however, Japanese investment was $23 billion. 120
The result of this increased investment by the Japanese was a
call by Malaysia's Prime Minister for the creation of a "East
Asian Economic Caucus" for the Asia Pacific. A "caucus" that
would exclude the United States. Thus far, Japan has not
actively supported any such arrangement, being unwilling to
sacrifice its relationship with the U.S. However, if the
current "Japan bashing" should lead to any concrete action the
Japanese perceive as harmful to their economic health, it is
not hard to imagine them taking the lead in using such a
causcus as the basis for an Asian trading bloc centered in
Tokyo
.
Since the end of the Cold War, U. S . -Japanese relations
have become more confrontational . The tone of the Japanese
press has become more frank in critical assessment of American
problems. Also, the press has become more explicit in its
perceptions of Japan's future role in the political spectrum.
In the introduction to an interview with Yukio Sato and Daniel
Bell conducted by Akihiko Tanaka, the following appeared:
The international order that will succeed the bipolar
world is only a matter of speculation at this point, but
it is certain that Japan will play a major role. With the
Soviet Union in shambles, the United States struggling
120 Ibid, pp. 119-20.
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with domestic problems it cannot muster the political will
to resolve, and Germany preoccupied with reunification,
Japan seems ideally situated to take a leading role in the
world order of the coming century. 121
The sentiment expressed in the above is indicative of a new
found willingness on the part of Japan to be more openly
critical of the United States. While Japan is usually still
willing to follow the U.S. lead in foreign policy, there is a
growing resentment over not being consulted before such
policies are announced. The clamor in the U.S. over Tokyo's
response to the Gulf War is an example. A more recent example
was the response by Japan when President Bush announced the
$24 billion aid package for Russia. The Japanese openly
expressed frustration over not being consulted before the
announcement. Where previously such frustration would
probably been expressed in private, the Japanese government is
more willing to have its displeasure known publicly.
Increasingly, Japan is asserting its new economic and, by
extension, political influence on global affairs.
B. WHITHER JAPAN?
According to Yukio Sato, Japan is entering into the third
phase of its post-WWII foreign policy development. He sees
this phase as one in which Japan is in a position to "affect
121
"Looking Ahead," Look Japan, January 1992, p. 4
(Hereafter Sato-Bell) . (Italics added)
.
any major event in the world." 12 " Additionally, he sees the
areas- that must be addressed in this policy as: 1) gaining the
other industrialized nations in Asia as policy partners, 2)
managing conflicts in Asia, 3) playing a certain political
role, and 4) assuring Japan's neighbors they have nothing to
fear from her. 123 As Professor Bell puts it,
If Japan is becoming effective and independent, then two
questions have to be asked. One is, what power does Japan
have; and second is how does one define historical
interests . 124
The power Japan possesses is mostly economic; however, the
JSDF and JMSDF have grown in size during the Cold War to such
a degree that they constitute a credible military force, far
more than just a defensive force. The historical interests
are harder to assess. The U. S . -Japanese alliance was a result
of the Cold War, not historical affinity. In fact, Professor
Edward Olsen believes without a U.S. presence in the Pacific,
it is possible Japan and the Pacific Rim would not have been
important participants in the Cold War. 125 Olsen has argued
that:
Were it not for the United State's presence in the Asia-
Pacific region, transferring U.S. -Soviet tension to the
Soviet Union's eastern flank, it is doubtful that the area
would have become a substantial participant in the Cold
122 Sato-Bell, p. 7
123 Ibid, p. 7.
124 Ibid, p. 7. (italics added)
.
125 Edward A. Olsen, " A New American Strategy in Asia?,
"
Asian Survey, 31, no. 12 (1991), p. 1146.
War.... In Asia the United States was the central vehicle
for transmitting Cold War tensions with the Soviet Union
to the region through various bilateral treaties and less
formal relations. 126
While this statement seems a bit too broad in its assertion,
it does point out the way Cold War bipolarity drove U.S.
foreign policy in the region and, as a result, the foreign
policy of those countries it was allied with, especially
Japan
.
Another factor in assessing the direction Japanese foreign
policy could take is the emergence of new Japanese leaders
called by many analysts the "new internationalists." Kenneth
Pyle makes it clear, however, that these new leaders are not
driven by liberalism, but by "a broadened conception of
Japan's own national interest ... .a new kind of
nationalism" 127 This nationalism is divided into three
parts: 1) it is good to support a liberal economic order, 2)
Japanese institutions, if necessary, must be reformed to
reflect these international norms, and 3) a more liberal
Japanese philosophy must be developed. This new foreign
policy takes into account other traditions, yet is willing
provide support for a more pro-active international posture,
up to and including participation in collective security
126 Edward A. Olsen, "A New American Strategy in Asia?,"
Asian Survey, 31, no. 12 (1991), p. 1146.
127 Pyle, p. 20.
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arrangements. 128 Another analyst who endorses this view is
T. Kataoka, a Senior research fellow at the Hoover Institute.
In an interview with the author, Professor Kataoka expressed
the belief that Japan would gradually expand the uses of the
SDF and become more active in international relations and
security arrangements, when it suited Japan's purposes.
Ichiro Ozawa, the apparent leader of this new school of
thought, feels the question facing Japan today in deciding her
future role in the world is
whether to say 'Japan is special and we can only offer
money' or devise more comprehensive assistance through the
U.N. that does no go beyond the bounds of the
constitution. I believe the former would isolate us from
the international community. 129
While people like Ozawa may be the wave of the future, most
analysts do not see Japan changing rapidly from the narrow
policies she has followed for the past forty-plus years.
Therefore, it would be instructive to watch Ozawa and his
followers as they maneuver behind the scenes. It is believed
Ozawa was offered the Prime Ministership during the last
change; however, for now he declined the offer. 130 Perhaps
he is waiting to consolidate his power so he will not run into
the same hardships former Prime Minister Nakasone encountered
in trying to forge a new direction in Japanese foreign policy.
128 Ibid, p. 21.
Quoted in Pyle, p. 23 from an interview in Japan
Economic Journal, November 3, 19 90.
130 Pyle, p. 22
Just as George Bush will probably be the last WWII-era
president in the U.S., the Japanese are also nearing the end
of their WWII-era politicians. Once they pass from the stage,
it may be possible and easier for Japan to move into a new
phase of foreign policy formulation that reflects her economic
and military status. This is bound to alter Japan's relations
with the U.S., as Tokyo pursues its own foreign policy
initiatives
.
C. THE POSSIBILITY OF CLOSER RUSSIAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS
While it would be easy to dismiss the possibility of
closer Russian-Japanese relations out of hand, that would be
an irresponsible move. The U. S . -Japanese relationship was
based primarily on Cold War expediency. While it is also true
that Japanese-Russian history is filled with conflict, there
is also a history of economic trade. If strategic planning is
only done for the short term, as is usually the case in the
U.S., certain facts tend to be overlooked. Japanese-U. S
.
relations are strained at present because of trade and a
growing realization in Japan that it has the capability to
venture out on its own in policy arenas it once left to the
United States to lead. The displeasure the Japanese expressed
before, during, and after President Bush's trip to Japan,
especially with the inclusion of the "Big Three" auto
executives, is indicative of a Japan that is learning "to say
no. "
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Japanese businesses are more closely associated with the
political process than in our country; hence, to paraphrase an
American industrialist, the belief is "what's good for
Japanese business is good for Japan." There is a tendency to
accept short-term losses in exchange for long-term gain in
Japan. While the Japanese see the U.S. as an ally, they can
also view this country as an economic competitor. An economic
competitor that must be beaten. There is in both countries
"an obsession with being Number One." 131 This obsession
could lead the Japanese to closer relations with Russia, both
to have another access to raw materials and to show its
independence from the U.S.'s sphere of influence. The
possibility of closer relations with Russia could also come
about as a result of a resolution of the Kurile Islands
question, especially if such a resolution was structured in
such a way as to include development agreements between Japan
and Russia. Another scenario could involve just the Russian
Far East, if the calls for independence are realized.
Is such an alignment possible? Is it anything for the U.S.
to genuinely concern itself with in the long term ? The
prudent answer should be to prepare for such a development,
just in case. Given the resource wealth of the Russian Far
East and the technological and financial abilities of Japan,
such a relationship could be beneficial for both parties. If
Yoichi Funabashi, "Japan and America: Global
Partners," Foreign Policy, no. 86 (1992), p. 35.
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one only concentrates on the conflict between these two
countries, then it is easy to overlook the financial and
business dealings that also went on between them, especially
during the Cold War. There are many shortcomings in Russia
that would need to be overcome, for instance, lack of a
quality labor base; however, to dismiss out of hand the
possibility that Japan might enter into new multi-dimensional
relations with Russia is to ignore Japan's way of doing
business
.
Just as the Japanese realize the danger of a unilateralist
U.S., the U.S. needs to realize the destabilizing influence a
Japan largely independent of American influence could be in
the Pacific Rim. It will not do for the United States to aver
that it has an Asia policy and then attempt to transpose the
European policy that has been used for decades to the Pacific.
As one analyst noted
I do not think that America, as of yet, has a new
orientation towards Asia; it is only repeating old
cliches. . . .Japan itself has a much greater opportunity to
play a leading and independent role, as long as it does
not appear threatening to the other countries with which
it has been affiliated. 132
Unless the U.S. does come up with a uniquely Asian policy, it
can only watch its influence in the region continue to ebb.
If the new internationalists assume positions of leadership in
Japan, there will be a far more active foreign policy. There
Sato-Bell, p. 7. This observation was made by
Professor Bell.
may also be calls from those prefectures closest to the
Russian Far East to make investments in the area. bj This
could be a problem for the U.S., if such investment led to an
economic alliance in the Pacific that excluded the United
States .
While the Kurile Islands are a stumbling block to closer
Russo-Japanese relations at present, it does not appear that
this will remain so. While it would be an overstatement to
contend that the removal of this one obstacle will open the
floodgates of investment in Russia by Japan, there is a
historic basis for trade and diplomatic relations between the
two countries. Conversely, even in the post-war era,
especially recently, U.S. and Japanese relations have been
uneven. The United States is looked upon as a counter to any
rising Japanese hegemonic tendencies by other countries in the
region; however, those same countries have no fear, and in
fact desire closer economic relations with Japan. The U.S.'s
ability to continue to perform its "balancing" function could
be threatened by closer economic and diplomatic ties between
Russia and Japan, if those ties resulted in a Japanese attempt
to continue to exploit old Cold War animosities between the
two countries to further Japanese economic policies.
133 Yoichi Funabashi, "Japan and the New World Order,"
Foreign Affairs, 70, no. 5 (1991/2), pp. 73-74. This was part
of a special issue of Foreign Affairs which dealt with America
and the Pacific.
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D. POSSIBLE COURSES FOR THE UNITED STATES
In formulating its Asian policy, the United States cannot
ignore the Russian Far East and its growing calls for
independence. From an economic standpoint, it is necessary
for the U.S. to be just as involved as Japan and other Pacific
Rim nations in the development of this area. Also, the
investment can be direct. One of the faults exhibited in the
pre-coup era was a blind adherence to Gorbachev, even when his
viability was obviously gone. During the post-coup phase,
this continued, much to the consternation of Yeltsin and his
supporters. The United States needs a flexible policy with
regard to Russia. One that does not undercut Yeltsin, or
whoever is in power, but also one that does not limit U.S.
options
.
The United States also does not want to have to contend
with a potentially hotile Japanese-led trading bloc in Asia.
If the United States is able to assist Russia in developing
the Russian Far East, she will have a partner to counter-
balance the Japanese. With the end of the Cold War, it is
relations such as this, unheard of previously, that should be
analyzed for the long-term potential economic and political
advantages they may offer. The tremendous resource wealth of
the Russian Far East offers the potential of a "win-win"
situation for all concerned.
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E. CONCLUSION
As the twenty-first century approaches, the United States
is faced with many opportunities and challenges. One
outgrowth of the lessening of tensions in the world is the
need to reassess our foreign relationships. Relationships
that were primarily based on Cold War policy may no longer be
valid. Our relation with Japan needs to be re-examined in
light of these changes. Also, the United States needs to
recognize the possibility of relationships being formed that
were impossible during the Cold War. One is a Russian-
Japanese relationship; another is a U.S. -Russian relationship
in the Pacific. The economic potential of the Russian Far
East is substantial. To allow the Japanese a free hand in
this area would be irresponsible.
The predominance of military alliances so evident during
the Cold War will decline. With this decline, a new emphasis
on economics and economic relationships will assume
prominence. Countries that were allies during the Cold War
for military and security reasons could be viewed as economic
competitors. Conversely, countries that were adversaries
during the Cold War could be viewed as economic and political
partners. Economic latitude given during the Cold War must be
reviewed.
Possible threats to U.S. interests could come from
unimaginable coalitions. The growing independent attitude in
Japan does not have to become a threat to the United States,
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if an attempt is made now to reassess the U. S . -Japanese
relationship in a new light. Recognizing that Japan is, after
the U.S., the largest maritime force in the Pacific, it is
easy to see the possibility for conflict if relations between
our two countries were to fall apart. A completely
independent Japan in the Pacific would be perceived as a
threat to its neighbors if the United States was not present
to counter it. By treating Japan as an equal, the U.S. can
formulate a policy that will allow both countries to expand
economically and allow Japan to grow gradually into her
expanding military capability. By doing so, the United States
may be able to assure Japan's neighbors that they have little
to fear from this new Japan and that the world has much to
gain by bringing Japan completely into the family of nations.
By examining pre-Bolshevik foreign policy in Russia, an
attempt has been made to discover parallels between past and
future policy. Russia was a trans-continental power with
interest in both Europe and the Pacific. While its role in
Europe was often one of a mediator, its policy can also be
characterized as one of opportunism. Establishing temporary
and secret alliances was not a uniquely Russian action. In
the Pacific, Russian policy mirrored the alliance structure
utilized in Europe. Her concern appeared to be one of
maintaining balance in the Pacific by entering into alliances
with China to counter rising Japanese hegemony.
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The breakup of the Soviet Union into independent republics
with the absence of any credible central government presents
new challenges to the United States. Yeltsin and the Russian
republic have the most potential to re-assume the historic
Russian role; however, the animosity built up in other
republics towards Russia must be settled, as well as internal
tension in Russia itself as a result of forced ties under
Socialism. What seems certain is Russia still possesses the
economic potential in resources that it always has; the
ability of the country to exploit these resources to its
benefit is the key to its future role in the world.
The countries of the West have the capital and
technological expertise to assist Russia in realizing its
economic potential. U.S. and Russian policy towards one
another needs to be one of mutual respect, due not only to the
nuclear arsenal each possesses. A resurgent Russia need not
necessarily be feared by the U.S., however, the U.S. must
recognize that the path our former adversary may follow will
help in the formulation of a U.S. policy that is mutually
beneficial. By examining pre-Bolshevik policies, the U.S. can
increase its chances of understanding Russia absent the biases
built up during the Cold War. Recognizing that a Russo-
Japanese alliance could adversely tilt the "balance of power"
in the Pacific, the United States can preclude this from
happening by constructively engaging Russia now. Actions
taken now to take advantage of the opportunities offered by
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the end of the Cold War may stop the formation of hitherto





Alves, Dora. Change, Interdependence, and Security in the
Pacific Basin: The 1990 Pacific Symposium. Washington, D.C.:
National Defense University Press, 1991.
Alves, Dora. Cooperative Security in the Pacific Basin: The
1988 Pacific Symposium. Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University Press, 1990.
Babbage, Ross, ed. The Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s.
Rushcutters Bay, Australia: Pergamon Press, 1989.
da Cunha, Derek. Soviet Naval Power in the Pacific. Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990.
Daniels, Robert V. Russia: The Roots of Confrontation.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.
Dickson, Bruce and Harry Harding. Economic Relations in the
Asian-Pacific Region. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute,
1987.
Dienes, Leslie. Soviet Asia: Economic Development and
National Policy Choices. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.
Dienes, Leslie and Theodore Shabad. The Soviet Energy System.
Washington, D.C.: V.H. Winston and Sons, 1979.
Friedman, George and Meredith Lebard. The Coming War With
Japan. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.
Gaddis, John Lewis. Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United
States: An Interpretive History. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1981.
Gelman, Harry. Policy Implications : A Strategy for the West:
The Causes and Effects of Gorbachev' s Far East Behavior.
1990, (An unpublished manuscript).
Goldman, Marshall I. Gorbachev' s Challenge : Economic Reform
in the Age of High Technology. New York: W.W. Norton and
Company, 1987.
Hane, Mikiso. Modern Japan: A Historical Survey. Boulder:
Westview Press, 1986.
95
Haus, Leah A. Globalizing the GATT: The Soviet Union's
Successor States, Eastern Europe, and the International
Trading System. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1992.
Jacob, Jo Dee Catlin. Beyond the Hoppo Ryodo : Japanese-
Soviet-American Relations in the 1990s. Washington, D.C.: The
AEI Press, 1991.
Jane's Weapons Systems, 1990-91. London: Jane's Publishers,
Ltd., 1990.
Jane's Fighting Ships, 1990-91. London: Jane's Publishers,
Ltd., 1990.
Japanese Defense Agency. Defense of Japan-1990 . Tokyo: 1990.
Koropekyj , I.S. and Gertrude E. Schroeder, eds . Economics of
Soviet Regions. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981.
Maki, John M. Conflict and Tension in the Far East- Key
Documents, 1894-1960 . Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1961.
Malozemoff, Andrew. Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904
:
With Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958.
Manning, Robert A. Asian Policy: The New Soviet Challenge in
the Pacific. New York: Priority Press Publications, 1988.
Masahide, Shibusawa. Japan and the Asian Pacific Region:
Profile of Change. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.
Mathieson, Raymond S. Japan's Role in Soviet Economic Growth:
Transfer of Technology Since 1965. New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1979.
Mee, Charles L., Jr. Meeting at Potsdam. New York: M. Evans
and Company, 1975.
Polmar, Norman. Guide to the Soviet Navy. Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1983.
Prestowitz, Clyde V., Jr. Trading Places: How We Are Giving
Our Future to Japan and How to Reclaim It. New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1988.
Raft, Bryan and Geoffrey Till. The Sea in Soviet Strategy.
Annapolis: The Naval Institute Press, 1989.
96
Rees, David. The Soviet Seizure of the Kuriles. New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1985.
Reischauer, Edwin 0. The Japanese Today. Cambridge, MA:
Belknap Press, 1988.
Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. A History of Russia. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1984.
Safarian, A.E. Governments and Multinationals : Policies in
the Developed Countries. Washington, D.C.: British-North
American Committee, 1983
.
Sanders, Sol W. Living Off the West: Gorbachev' s Secret
Agenda and Why It Will Fail. New York: Madison Books, 1990.
Scalapino, Robert A., ed. Economic Development in the Asia-
Pacific Region: Appropriate Roles for Japan and the United
States. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
Scrivener, Ronald. USSR Economic Handbook. London:
Euromonitor Publications, Ltd., 1986.
Segal, Gerald. The Soviet Union and the Pacific. Boston:
Unwin Hyman, 19 90
.
Seton-Watson, Hugh. The Russian Empire, 1801-1917 . Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1967.
Snow, Donald M. National Security : Enduring Problems in a
Changing Defense Environment. New York: St. Martin's Press,
1991.
Thakur, Ramesh and Carlyle A. Thayer. The Soviet Union as an
Asian Pacific Power: Implications of Gorbachev' s 1986
Vladivostok Initiative . Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.
Thambipillai , Pushpa and Daniel C. Matuszewski. The Soviet
Union and the Asia-Pacific Region: Views from the Region. New
York: Praeger, 1989.
Thompson, Michael L. The Northern Territories : Case Study in
Japanese-Soviet Relations . Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate
School, 1982.
U.S. Department of Defense. Soviet Military Power, 1990.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989.
Van Peer, Fred H. The Northern Territories Problem: A Key
Factor in Soviet-Japanese Relations? . Army Command and
General Staff College, 1982.
97
West, Philip and Frans A.M. Alting von Geusau. The Pacific
Rim and the Western World. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.
Whiting, Allen S. Siberian Development and East Asia.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981.
Zagoria, Donald S., ed. Soviet Policy in East Asia. New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982.
ARTICLES
Akino, Yutaka. "East of Eden." Look Japan, July 19 91.
Armitage, Richard L. "U.S. Security in the Pacific in the
21st Century." Strategic Review, 18, No. 3 (1991).
Atkinson, Scott. "The USSR and the Pacific Century." Asian
Survey, 30, No. 7 (1990).
Auer, James E. "Article Nine of Japan's Constitution: From
Renunciation of Armed Force 'Forever' to the Third Largest
Defense Budget in the World." Law and Contemporary Problems
,
53, Nos. 1 and 2 (1990)
.
Auer, James E. and Marius B. Jensen. "U.S. -Japan Relations:
The End of Interdependence." SAIS Review, 11, No. 1 (1991).
Aurelia, George. "Japan's America Problem: The Japanese
Response to U.S. Pressure." Washington Quarterly, 14, No. 3
(1991) .
Awanohara, Susumu. Far Eastern Economic Review, 13, November
1986. (An untitled article).
Bosworth, Stephen W. "The United States and Asia." Foreign
Affairs, 71, No. 1 (1991/2).
Crowe, William J. and Alan Romberg. "Rethinking Security in
the Pacific." Foreign Affairs, 70, No. 2 (1991).
Department of Defense. "A Strategic Framework for the Asian
Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century, A Report to
Congress." 28 February 1991.
Destler, I.M. "Beyond Mutual Recrimination: Building a Solid
U.S. -Japan Relationship in the 1990s." International
Security, 46, No. 1 (1990/1).
Funabashi, Yoichi . "Japan and America: Global Partners."
Foreign Policy, No. 8 6 (19 92)
.
98
Funabashi, Yoichi. "Japan and the New World Order." Foreign
Affairs, 70, No. 5 (1991/2)
.
Gorbachev, Mikhail. "USSR Foreign Relations With Japan: A
Peaceful World Order Depends on Perestroika . " Vital
Speeches, 57, No. 15 (1991)
Iida, Ken'ichi. "Disappointed But Determined." Look Japan,
July 1991.
Kaifa, Toshiki . "Japan's Vision." Foreign Policy, 80, Fall
1990.
Legvold, Robert. "Soviet Policy in East Asia." Washington
Quarterly, 14, No. 2 (1991) .
Mack, Andrew and Martin O'Hare. "Moscow-Tokyo and the
Northern Territories Dispute." Asian Survey, 30, No. 4
(1990)
.
Mineshige, Miyuki . Look Japan, July 1991. (An untitled
article)
.
Morimoto, Tadao . "The Price of Peace." Look Japan, January
1992.
Nishimura, Kunio. "A Matter of Justice." Look Japan,
February 1992.
Nishimura, Kunio. "The Very Beginning." Look Japan, July
1991.
Nishimura, Kunio. "Making History." Look Japan, December
1991.
Nye, Joseph S. "American Strategy After Bi-Polarity . "
International Affairs, 66, No. 3 (1990) .
Olsen, Edward A. "A New American Strategy in Asia?." Asian
Survey, 31, No. 12 (19 91) .
Peters, Mary Elizabeth. "Free Trade Agreements as the
Economic and Legal Solution to Bilateral Trade Relationships:
The Case of Japan." Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 8,
No. 2 (19 90)
.
Polomka, Peter. "U.S. -Japan Beyond the Cold War." Australian
Journal of International Affairs, 44, No. 1 (1990) .
Pyle, Kenneth. "How Japan Sees Itself At Home, In Asia, and
Around the World." The American Enterprise, 2, No. 6 (1991) .
99
Pyle, Kenneth. "The Post-Cold War Order in East Asia: The
View From Tokyo." (An unpublished draft)
.
Quinn-Judge, Sophie. "Hobbled by old habits." Far Eastern
Economic Review, 12 March 1992.
Randolph, R. Sean. "The Soviet Economic Role in Asia and the
Pacific: A Business Perspective." Asian Survey, 30, No. 12
(1990) .
Sanger, David E. "U.S. -Japan Group to Explore Big Energy
Field Off Siberia." The New York Times, National Edition, 29
January 1992, Sec. C, pp. 1 and 5, col. 1.
Singh, Bilveer. "The Asia-Pacific in the Era of Reduced
Military Presence." Issues and Studies, 26, No. 9 (1990).
Solomon, Richard H. "US Relations with East Asia and the
Pacific: A New Era." U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 2,
No. 21 (27 May 1991)
.
Tanaka, Akihiko. "Unwilling Donor." Look Japan, November
1991.
Weisman, Steven R. "No Offers of Billions to Soviets, Tokyo
Says." The New York Times, National Edition, 15 April 1991,
Sec. A, p. 5, col. 1.
Weisman, Steven R. "Dispute Over Seized Islands is Delaying
Japanese Aid to Russia." The New York Times, National
Edition, 7 February 1992, Sec. A, p. 6, col. 3.
Whiting, Allen S. Yakutia Gas for a Northeast Energy
Consortium, 1992. (An unpublished draft).
Zagoria, Donald S. "Soviet Policy in East Asia: The Quest for
Constructive Engagement." The Korean Journal of Defense
Analysis, 2, No. 1 (1990)
.
Ziegler, Charles E. "Soviet Strategies for Development: East






1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 52 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940-5100
3. OP-60, The Pentagon, Room 4E556 1
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350
4. OP-607, The Pentagon, Room 4D563 1
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350
5. Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau 1
Chairman, National Security Affairs (NS/Bn)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943








8. LT Jeffery L. LaCaze 1
513 Three Oaks Drive
Chesapeake, Virginia 23320
9. Assistant Secretary for East Asia 1
and Pacific Affairs
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20520
10. Admiral Charles R. Larson, USN 1
U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fort Smith, Hawaii 96851-5025
101
11. CDR Paul Giarra, USN
Japan Desk Director
East Asia Pacific Region
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs
The Pentagon, Room 4C84
Washington, D.C. 20301-2400
12. CDR Donald A. Jagoe
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCS (J-8), The Pentagon, Room 4E475
Washington, D.C. 20301
102


uuuLtY KNOX LIBRARv
GAYLORD S

